

The State, Insurgency Conflicts and Educational Underdevelopment in Nigeria: Mirroring the Chibok and Dapchi School Girls Experiences

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ABSTRACT: This study set out to examine the Nigerian state and education of the girl-child in Nigeria, a case study of the kidnapping of the Chibok and Dapchi school girls. This research is important because the education of the girl-child is very essential for national development. Regrettably, this has been hampered by the recurrent phenomenon of kidnapping in Northeastern Nigeria. The researcher adopted the Radical Feminism theory as the theoretical framework. This study used the historical approach that makes extensive use of the archive or secondary sources of data. This work found that Boko Haram insurgency has largely caused educational underdevelopment in Northeastern Nigeria; government response has been very poor; the cases of the kidnapping of the school girls have been highly politicised. To this effect, this study recommended government should reunite and reintegrate the girls with their families; government proactive measures to guard against a reoccurrence; government employing a comprehensive strategy that can address the economic and social cause of the insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria; punishing of Boko Haram insurgent sponsors; rebuilding of schools and making them learning-friendly for overall development of the northeast.

KEYWORD: Nigerian state, education, girls, kidnapping, Boko Haram insurgency and underdevelopment in education.

INTRODUCTION

The government must provide an enabling environment for its citizens to learn and educate themselves. While this is true for many developed countries, the same cannot be said for most of the developing world, and this is especially the case in parts of Nigeria. On the night of April 14-15 (2014), 276 female students from a public high school in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria were abducted from their school (Perkins, 2014, p. 1). Boko Haram, an extremist terror group based in northeast Nigeria, said it was behind the kidnappings.

Amina Ali, one of the missing girls, was found in May 2016. She said other girls were still in Boko Haram, but six of them had already died (BBC News, May 20, 2016). Today, there are many different estimates of how many of these girls were released despite questions. As if that were not enough, on February 19, 2018 at 5:30 pm, 110 schoolchildren between the ages of 11 and 19 were kidnapped from the Government College for Women in Science and Technology (GGSTC) by the terrorist group Boko Haram. Dapchi, which is located in Bulabulin, Yunusari Local Government District of Yobe State, northeastern Nigeria (Sahara Reporters, March 2, 2018). Ibrahim Geidam, Governor of Yobe State, said Nigerian soldiers were to blame

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for bringing down a military checkpoint in the city. Some 170 miles north of Chibok, where more than 276 schoolgirls were captured by Boko Haram in 2014, is Dapchi (BBC News, February 26, 2018).

Ibrahim Geidam, Governor of Yobe State, is upset that troops were withdrawn from Dapchi just hours before the kidnapping, allegedly without the knowledge of local police or the state government. The military was initially silent on this claim (This Day Live, 2018). A few days later, the army tried to explain why they left, making statements that seemed to contradict each other. The army said it pulled its troops out of the city because there was no evidence of Boko Haram activity nearby. The army commander, also said that he officially handed over Dapchi's security to the police before he left. In a document Sahara-Reporters received from the military on February 6, 2018, the general said he was concerned Boko Haram might attack nearby Damaturu, which is some 60 miles away. This contradicts the army's earlier claim that it had good reason to believe that Boko Haram had left the area. The Yobe State Police Commissioner vehemently denied the army's claim that they had formally informed his department of the army's withdrawal. The army also did not provide any evidence that the police had been informed of their withdrawal (This Day Live, 2018). If you look at the stories above, it is clear that the Boko Haram insurgency is preventing girls from going to school in northeast Nigeria today. Even more disappointing is the fact that after Chibok, the government did not take sufficient precautions to prevent Dapchi from happening again.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the abduction of Chibok and Dapchi school girls in terms of causes, consequences, and implications for the development of education in northeastern Nigeria. All this must be done with the main objective of offering viable solutions to prevent this shameful phenomenon from happening again in the future.

Statement of the Problem

Although many conferences, seminars and workshops have been held in many parts of the world on how to improve girls' education, especially in Nigeria, but little has been achieved in this regard. It is sad to note that the government could do little to protect itself against the kidnapping of a girl from Chibok and Dapchi schools by Boko Haram insurgents. These actions have greatly affected girls' education in this part of the country, with huge negative long-term consequences. It is a fundamental truth that girls' education is a human right. This is also our responsibility. Girls' education contributes significantly to the development of a stable, prosperous and healthy nation-state whose citizens are active, productive and empowered. However, the data disappointingly indicates that in Nigeria:

- More than 5.5 million girls do not attend school.
- 40% of women and 28% of men have never attended school.
- Nearly two-thirds of women in the Northwest and Northeast regions have no education, compared to less than 15% in the South-South.
- The net enrollment rate in primary school is 56% for girls and 61% for boys.
- Dropout rates are higher in the sixth grade of primary school and higher among girls than among boys (FGN, 2014, pp. 1-9).

The above is a very dirty statistic. Therefore, this study will carefully examine the phenomenon of abduction of school girls from Chibok and Dapchi in northeastern Nigeria. It will also critically examine the extent to which the Nigerian state has fulfilled its legal role in providing adequate security and an enabling environment for girls' education. In addition, the study will offer realistic recommendations to improve girls' education in Nigeria.

Theoretical bases

The theory that will be used to guide this study is that of radical feminism. Some exponents or proponents of this theory include scholars such as Ellen Willis, Melissa Farley , Gail Dines , Janice Raymond , Germaine Greer , Sheila Jeffries , Dane Bell, Mary Daly, Shulamith Firestone , Cathy Sarachild , T-Grace Atkinson , Carol Hanish , Alice. Ehole, Ann Koedt, *Ellen Levin*, *Anita Rapone*, Judith Brown , Katherine McKinnon , and Julie Bindel).

Radical feminism is a point of view within feminism that calls for a radical reorganization of society in which male supremacy will disappear from all social and economic situations (Willis, 1984, p. 117). Gamble (2001, p. 25) says that the idea of "radical feminism" grew out of the women's liberation movement in the United States. It grew strongly due to the civil rights movement, which gained momentum in the 1960s. Many of the women who have joined the cause of radical feminism have already participated in radical protests against racism.

Radical feminism fits into the history of the second wave of feminism that began in the early 1960s. In the late 1960s, many local women's groups, such as the Women's Liberation Front (WLF, for its acronym in English), provided diplomatic explanations of what radical feminism was. Devra Weber, who helped found the WLF, says: " Radical feminists were against patriarchy, but not always against capitalism. At least in our group they opposed the so-called male-led national liberation struggle (Linden-Ward and Green, 1993)., p. 418). "Radical feminism had a 'powerful influence' on the 'women's movement,' and that was a big part of how feminist politics turned out" (Willis, 1984, p. xi). getting rid of patriarchy not only through politics, but also by challenging social norms and institutions, including challenging the idea of traditional gender roles, combating the idea that women are sex objects, and educating more people about things such as rape and violence against women.

Early radical feminism, emerging from second wave feminism in the 1960s, generally viewed patriarchy as a "transhistorical phenomenon" that is older or deeper than other forms of oppression, "not just the most ancient and universal, but the primordial form" and a model for all others.. More recent politics to emerge from radical feminism ranged from cultural feminism to more complex politics that put class, economics, and other things on the same level as patriarchy and repressive forces (Willis, 1984, pp. 118-141).

Echols (1989, p. 139) says that radical feminists see patriarchal gender relations as the root cause of women's oppression rather than legal systems (as do liberal feminists) or class conflicts (as in the anarchist feminism, socialist feminism and Marxist feminism). Radical feminists say that society is a patriarchy in which men control the class of women. They say that patriarchy has made women "different" from men, and that is why women have been systematically oppressed and humiliated. They also say that men as a group benefit from the mistreatment of women. Radical feminists want to get rid of patriarchy and believe that the best way to do that and to get rid of any kind of oppression is to start a revolution and change what causes it. Zerilli argues (2005, p. 101) that while some radical feminists say that the oppression of women is the most basic form of oppression and cuts across all other forms of oppression, others acknowledge that other forms of oppression occur simultaneously. and overlap each other. These other types of oppression can be based on race, social class, perceived attractiveness, sexual orientation, and ability, but they don't have to be.

Most people don't think of the patriarchal theory as all men always benefiting from the oppression of women. Instead, patriarchal theory says that the most important part of patriarchy is a relationship of dominance, in which one party responds to and uses the other for their benefit. Radical feminists believe that men (as a group) repress non-dominant women and men using social systems and other forms of control (Chesler, 2005, pp. 335-349). Radical feminists also believe that getting rid of patriarchy and other systems that keep one group at the head of another will free everyone from an unjust society. Some radical feminists like

Phyllis Chesler, Monique Wittig (in fiction), Mary Daly, Jill Johnston, and Robin Morgan wanted women to rule both women and men (Zerilli, 2005, pp. 101-102).

Redstockings co-founder Ellen Willis wrote in 1984 that radical feminists "brought sexual politics into the public domain", "created the vocabulary... with which second wave feminism entered popular culture", "began the fight to legalize abortion. they were the first to demand full equality in the so-called private sphere" ("housework and child care, emotional and sexual needs"), and "created an atmosphere of urgency" that almost led to the passage of the Equality Amendment (Willis, 1984, p. 118) Radical feminist theory can be seen in the way that the National Organization for Women (NOW), a feminist group that used to focus almost exclusively on economic issues, has now addressed these issues. issues (Willis, 1984, p. 138).

It makes sense to relate this theory to the topic of this study. Given that it is about the Nigerian government and girls' education, as well as a critique of the kidnapping of Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls, it makes sense to use radical feminist theory, as what its scholars have said about it is highly relevant. for kidnapping cases. Taking into account what scholars have previously said about radical feminist theory, this will help us show how important it is to stop gender inequality and the abuse of girls and women in general, and to create the conditions for their empowerment. especially in terms of education so that they can work and contribute positively to society. Many schoolgirls are taken from their homes, which violates their rights and self-esteem. According to the ideas of radical feminism, society as a whole should condemn such actions and allow girls to flourish in our society. Girls must be educated because it is the key to self-realization and the growth of society as a whole. This will give them more confidence, will prevent men from mistreating them, taking advantage of them and pushing them aside, and will help the Nigerian state to grow as a whole.

Research methodology

The approach to be used in this work is the historical approach. Also called the longitudinal research approach, this approach relies on the power of archives and documents.

Macmillan and Schumacher (1984, p. 23) defined historical research as "the systematic and objective identification, evaluation, and synthesis of evidence for the purpose of establishing facts and inferences about past events. It includes a critical examination of an earlier time in order to recreate a valid view of the past." Schafer (1974, pp. 63-64) states that "in historical research, the researcher examines documents and other sources that contain facts related to the topic of research to gain a better understanding of contemporary politics, practices, issues, and institutions". An attempt is made to study past events or combinations of events and to establish facts in order to reach conclusions about past events or predict future events. Secondary data sources were relevant government publications, newspapers, magazines, international and local journals, journals, textbooks, previous theses/projects and Internet sources.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Concept of State

Many scholars have defined or explained the concept of the state in different ways. Rothbard (2012, p. 1) explains that "some theorists revere the State as the apotheosis of society; others see it as a friendly, though often ineffective, organization with social ends; but almost everyone sees it as a necessary means to the ends of humanity, a means to be countered by the "private sector" and often won in this competition for resources." The pitfall of this work is that it presupposes the success of the State in the successful organization of society There are many failed states in the world today, which explains in part the need for research.

Schumpeter (1942, p. 198) says that the state is an organization in society that tries to maintain a monopoly on the use of force and violence in a given area. It is also the only organization in the community that

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receives money not through voluntary contributions or payment for services, but by forcing people to pay. Other people and organizations make money by peacefully and voluntarily producing goods and services and selling them to other people. The state, on the other hand, makes money by making people do things, like using and threatening to use a prison and a bayonet. After using force and violence to get their money, the state generally continues to control and tell their people how to do other things. One would think that it would be enough to look at all the states throughout history and around the world to prove this point, but myths have been around for so long that it is important to explain them in more detail. The problem with this job is that she had to be careful about using "coercion" regarding revenue collection, which makes her seem more of a monster.

Lasky (1981, p. 59) points out that "the State continues to be important and ubiquitous for us. It is the cornerstone of the modern social edifice, and it is in its superiority over all other forms of social grouping that its special nature is to be sought. This work explains more as follows:

Within its territory, all its decisions are binding on everyone who lives there. Even if they consider their decisions to be wrong or stupid, they must follow them according to the law... The state does not use its power from scratch. It is used to accomplish certain goals, and its rules are modified primarily to accomplish goals that those who have the legal right to use their powers consider to be the best at a given time (Lasky, 1981, pp. 10-11).

Von Mises (1957, p. 112) says that once the state is established, the ruling group or "caste" must figure out how to maintain its power. Although they use force (which, of course, is embarrassing, according to this study), their main and long-term problem is that they have the wrong ideas. Because any government, not just the "democratic" one, needs the support of the majority of its people to stay in power. It is important to note that this support does not need to be active enthusiasm. It could be a kind of passive acceptance, as if it were a natural law that cannot be changed. But support must somehow mean acceptance, otherwise the active opposition of the majority of the population will eventually overwhelm the minority of state leaders. Since depredation must be paid for with a surplus product, the class that makes up the state - the regular bureaucracy (and the nobility) - must be a small minority in the country, although it can buy allies among important sectors of the population. Regarding the concept of State, Lasky (1981, pp. 11-12) correctly explains it as follows:

The state or "government" apparatus is everywhere, regulating the conditions of our lives from birth registration to death certificate. However, the nature of the state is difficult to understand. It may seem strange for something so common in public and private life, but it is this prevalence that makes it difficult to understand. Nothing is more important in political and social theory than the nature of the state, and nothing is more disputed.

Miliband (1969, p.49) maintains that "the State is not a thing, it does not exist. What the state represents is a set of specific institutions that together constitute its reality and interact as parts of what might be called a state system. That said, we must affirm at this stage that there are basically two currents of thought about the State: the liberal or bourgeois, and the Marxist or radical.

In liberal or bourgeois political thought, the State is an abstract entity, a moral and collective unit created by the common consent of the entire society. As a neutral body, the State is impartial in relation to all those within it. His primary duty is to balance things out and maintain law and order for the benefit of everyone within him.

Miliband (1969, p. 6) points out that this view of the state, especially in relation to the advanced capitalist countries, is fundamentally wrong; that this point of view, far from being a guide to reality, represents his profound confusion. He suggests that an alternative concept of the state can be found in the Marxist school of

thought. This school, which we join in this study, has pointed out that the scientific theory of the evolution of societies teaches us that the state appears only where there is class antagonism, because the state is only an instrument by which one class dominates another (Amin, 1983, p. 125).

In their landmark work, Marx and Engels laid the philosophical and intellectual foundations of Marxism from which the Marxist concept of the state could be derived. That is the "Communist Manifesto". In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1952, pp. 43-44) sought to popularize both the method of analysis (ie, historical and dialectical materialism) and the political program based on this analytical approach. The modern state is nothing more than a committee for the conduct of the common affairs of the entire bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels, 1952, pp. 43-44). In this sense, from the materialist point of view, the state is an instrument of the domination of the bourgeoisie, and it necessarily follows that the state is the political expression of this domination. In fact, the state is an important means of class domination in capitalist society.

This general scheme of work provides the basis for later Marxists in their conceptualization of the state, including Engels and Lenin. Marx and Engels (1952, p. 131) pointed out that State comprises "insoluble contradictions" and "irreconcilable antagonisms", a situation is reached that requires power above society, which would soften the conflict and would keep it within the "order" frame", then the state arises. Therefore, we argue that the state arises not only in the midst of class conflict, but also in the context of considering and resolving class conflict, and is therefore created in the interests of the ruling class. Lenin (1965, p. 9) reinforces this point of view with the following words: "The state is the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms." The state arises when and to the extent that class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled. Conversely, the existence of the state proves that class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

Thus, contrary to bourgeois mystification, the state is an instrument of class domination and control over the accumulation of property. Here, the state is seen as maintaining an order that favors the long-term interests of the ruling class. This is because it maintains the conditions under which the ruling class (bourgeoisie) rules. We must say that the above Marxist view of the state is in line with classical view of the state from which the Nigerian state draws its essence and meaning, but with some variations. We turn now to the study of the peculiar nature and character of the Nigerian State.

The Nigerian state is a product of British imperialism and colonialism. In fact, what we call the modern Nigerian state came about when capitalism established colonialism in many parts of Africa. Thus, the state of Nigeria was a colonial creation. It was created to monitor and supervise the infiltration of capitalists into pre-capitalist Nigerian societies. However, this view of the Nigerian state falls within the neo-Marxist school. This school attempts to reformulate and redefine classical Marxism to make it relevant to the Third World or Africa. This became what is commonly known as the interventionist state.

To understand the Nigerian state, we must begin by looking at the state and its relationship to the social formation. The immediate interest here is that the state in virtually all social formations in post-colonial Africa is institutionally designed in such a way that it enjoys very limited autonomy from social classes, especially the hegemonic class, and is therefore embedded in the class struggle. The colonial state was unequivocally the instrument of colonizing power in its struggle against the colonized. This mobilized forces to impose administration and structure the colonial economy in such a way that the balance of rewards was predominantly in favor of the mother country (Ake, 1981, pp. 18-25). This paper also argues that by highlighting the interventionist nature of the Nigerian state (African state), and its difference from the classical Marxist view of the state as being contrary to the usual requirements of capitalism, the colonial state was firmly committed to the intervention of force in foreign relations. labor. process. Force was used to destroy pre-capitalist social relations of production, to force peasants into the labor market and money economy (Ake, 1981, pp. 18-25).

Contrary to the above, Ake (1994, pp. 43-44) gives us an idea of the specificities of the state in Africa. For him, the state is a specific modality of class domination, mediated by the exchange of commodities, so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination differentiates itself and dissociates itself from the ruling class and even from society and acts as a force side by side with society (Ake, 1994), pp. 43-44). In other words, the state form of domination is a modality in which the system of the class domination mechanism becomes autonomous, that is, the institutional apparatus of class domination is largely independent of social classes, including social class. dominant (Ake, 1994), pp. 43-44).

While agreeing, albeit in principle, with the characterization of the state as a system of domination, Anikpo (1984, p. 30) nonetheless points out that this definition has an inherent problem of "over-abstraction", that, as already highlighted, it portrays the state as "something that hangs over society." However, he is of the opinion that the state is an instrument of class domination and exploitation. In this sense, the State may be referring to "the existence in any society of this type of coercive apparatus with hegemonic power capable of stratifying the population into identifiable social classes with differentiated access to the means of production or means of surplus accumulation., with concomitant hegemonic domination of one class over another"(Anikpo, 1984, p. 30).

Looking at the Nigerian state from this perspective, one cannot assume or imagine that the state or ruling class that controls it is monolithic. The state in Africa in general and in Nigeria in particular has very limited autonomy and is therefore immersed in class struggle. This fact has its roots in the historical origin of the State.

It had a particular impact on the Nigerian state, especially in the post-colonial era. Thus, a unique feature of the postcolonial socioeconomic formation, as Ake (1985, p. 3) puts it, is that "the state is neither autonomous nor hegemonic, especially in relation to foreign and local capital, as well as to the forces social constituents to others". The lack of autonomy of the Nigerian state largely reflects the nature of the socio-economic system of the country. Thus, in contrast to the socio-economic formations of capitalist countries, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, etc. etc., the Nigerian socio-economic background exhibits, among other things, the following structural conditions:

- 1) Outsourcing and the periphery of the national economy.
- 2) The rudimentary development of the productive forces, as well as the production and exchange of goods.
- 3) Unfair distribution, acute class and intercommunal competition, which gives rise to frequent and violent conflicts.
- 4) Constant political instability.

Eteng (1988, p. 120), in keeping with Ake's conceptualization of the Nigerian state, outlines some of the main consequences of the limited autonomy of the Nigerian state, including:

- 1) Political struggle tended to be wholly Hobbesian, with law largely coexisting with might; power is everything, since state power generates wealth, status privileges, protection and social responsibility.
- 2) The legitimacy of power and political processes becomes extremely problematic. Consequently, the crisis of power and nation-building is becoming endemic.
- 3) The state and its administrators and cohorts inevitably sink into mainstream capitalism, etc.

Therefore, structurally, the Nigerian state is a tributary and rentier state. Eteng (1988, pp. 120-121) adds that the class position and interests of state administrators and the ruling class they serve, however, drive the state to maintain its existence through the mechanisms of primitive accumulation. ; excessive taxes, oil royalties, land rents and taxes on oil companies and other companies, and the expropriation of peasants in general and

oil communities in particular. As long as the Nigerian state remains peripheral, it will continue to reinforce the idea that the state is an instrument of domination, perpetrating structural and institutional inequalities and injustices in the process.

Thus, the character and role of the Nigerian state is a reflection of its historical origin, rooted in the capitalist development of the country. The Nigerian state is a dependent neo-colonial peripheral capitalist state. In this regard, Nwabueze (1991, pp. 24-27) points out that “the ruling ruling class in Nigeria, like the State, is weak, dependent, lacking in hegemony and, therefore, unable to maintain its power. It is very fragmented and fragmented. As a result of its fractionalization, public policy is not seen in terms of class or collective interests”.

Thus, Webster (1990, p. 133) argued that division or lack of cohesion within the dominant or ruling class fosters dependency and promotes underdevelopment as factional classes struggle to strengthen their position in the state. As Roxborough (1979, p.133) puts it: “partly due to economic backwardness...complete domination within the power bloc by any particular class or faction is very rare. It is common to find various classes or factions dividing state power among themselves in a precarious balance. The state becomes the center of the struggle and no class can assume a hegemonic (or dominant) position in society as a whole. This struggle for access to state power and the struggle for influence on public policy leads to a situation in which political support is bought through a system of patronage and patronage (Webster, 1990, p.133). According to Nnoli (1980, p.127), it is from this dimension that ethnicity has come to dominate Nigerian politics and power games, as well as the abuse of State power.

This is the reality of the Nigerian state, created, of course, by colonialism. The power of the colonial state was not only absolute, but also arbitrary. It was full in scope, huge, brutal and often threatening. Therefore, we agree with Ake (2001, p. 6) when he argues that "much of what is extremely negative about African politics stems from the nature of the state, in particular its lack of autonomy, the immensity of its powers, its tendency to abuses and lack of immunity against them.”

The Nigerian state, seen from this perspective, is unstable, lacks hegemony and is used to accumulate power. Therefore, it is easily privatized by its guardians in a fierce power struggle. Once the state has been captured, as it was, it is used to contain opposition at all levels and is restructured to serve the narrow interests of those who dominate it. In the course of this development, people's interests suffer, rights are infringed, and people's interests become trivial.

According to Ake (1994, p. 7), “the ruling class uses the State as an instrument of its will. They privatize and exploit it for economic gain and use it in a repressive way to absolutize their power.” In addition, reasoning in terms of dependency and relying on the Marxist-instrumentalist vision of the State, Ake (2001, p. 63) postulates, among other things, that the State in the Third World does not have its own direction and reacts according to the needs of the capitalist system; that the local bourgeoisie (ruling class) joins the metropolitan bourgeoisie to maintain the dominant capitalist system; and that it would only take a revolution of political action to change the existing capitalist system of exploitation in the Third World.

The State, it must be said, continues to agree with our Marxist interpretation. This is simply to give a more specific feature of the state of Nigeria that does not deviate from our main point of view. The State in these circumstances expresses the need of those who dominate the economic system. Given this, and the persistence of existing property relations and the conditions of dependency and backwardness, as well as the deterioration of the economic situation, the ruling class left practically no room for maneuver (Ake, 2001, p. 37). Thus, the state became for both an instrument of primitive accumulation through partnership with capital and the political mechanism of exploitation.

Concept of Education

The term “education” has received many definitions and explanations. Education is the process of helping people learn or acquire the knowledge, skills, values, beliefs, and habits they need to be successful in life. Some teaching methods include storytelling, discussion, teaching, training, and guided research. Most of the time, teachers lead the way in education, but students can also teach themselves (Dewey, 2004, pp. 1-4). Learning can take place in formal or informal settings, and any experience that changes the way a person thinks, feels, or acts can be considered educational. Pedagogy is the science of how to teach. Education is formally divided into stages, such as preschool or kindergarten, elementary school, high school, college, university, or apprenticeship. Some governments and the UN have agreed that everyone has the right to education (Steer & Baudienville, 2010, p. 2). In most places, you have to go to school until you reach a certain age.

Historically, education began when adults taught children the knowledge and skills they considered important to their society. Before people learned to read and write, it was done by speaking and copying. Stories were a way for people to pass on their knowledge, values, and skills to the next generation. Formal education arose when people from different cultures began to learn things that were not easy to copy. There were schools in Egypt during the Middle Kingdom (Assmann, 2003, p. 127). There is no consensus on what is or should be the main goal or objectives of education. Some authors talk about how important this is for the individual, pointing out how it can help students grow as individuals, become more independent, find their own cultural identity or start a career. Other authors talk about how education helps in things like being a good citizen by turning students into productive members of society, which helps the economy in general and cultural preservation (Winch & Gingell, 2008, pp. 10-11).

The Nigerian Ministry of Education is responsible for education there. Local governments are responsible for the implementation of state policy regarding public education and public schools. The educational system consists of kindergarten, primary education, secondary education and higher education. Nigeria's education system differs from region to region in quality, curriculum, and funding (Aminu, 1990, pp. 581-586). *Abdullahi and Abdullah (2014, pp. 75–100) note that " Nigeria currently has the largest population of out-of-school youth in the world."* The above facts only require that steps be taken to correct these anomalies, which partly explains why this study is so important.

Osokoe (1989, p. 63) says that education is a basic human right and a key part of how children, communities, and nations grow and change. Opening the doors of the classroom to all children, especially girls, will help break the chains of poverty that are passed from generation to generation. This is because education is linked to all development goals, such as empowering women, improving maternal and child health, reducing hunger, ending the spread of HIV and other diseases of poverty., the acceleration of economic growth, the consolidation of peace and the incorporation of more women into Nigerian life. politics and development.

Girls' Education in Nigeria

Although Nigeria has had some problems with girls' education since independence in 1960, the government has worked diligently to ensure that all of its residents can receive an education. But in the late 1980s, more attention began to be paid to girls' education. The Nomadic Education Program and the Women's Education Plan were launched in 1986. The goal of the Women's Education Plan was to enable more women to attend school (Dauda, 2007, p. 3). Children from nomadic communities have been the focus of the nomadic education programme. This was done to protect the culture of nomadic communities and to ensure that children born in these communities could go to school. The curriculum has been modified to fit the 9-year basic education curriculum, with tools such as interactive radio instructions that can be used in a variety of ways (Connected Development [CODE], Feb 2017, pp. 1-3).

In 1989, the National Commission for Women was established to formulate a national policy on women and development. This was done to ensure that women's needs were included in the country's development priorities. Adebore and Olomukoro (2015, pp. 315–324) say this has led to the creation of educational institutions for women at the federal and state levels to give women and girls better access to education at the national and subnational levels. There is not much data on how many people went to school or how many were literate during that time. But this project was a success because the number of girls in primary school increased from more than 32% in 1970 to more than 86% in 1994 (Aromolaran, 2004, pp. 1-2).

To end illiteracy in Nigeria, the National Commission for Mass Adult Literacy and Non-Formal Education (NMEC) was created in 1991. NMEC projects have a strong focus on women and girls. The Family Support Basic Education Program was developed in the 1990s. Its aim was to facilitate school attendance for girls living in rural areas. Dauda (2007) says that this program has done many important things, such as the construction of early childhood education centers and primary schools (Dauda, 2007, p. 5). Universal Basic Education was amended in 1999 to eliminate differences in education based on gender and place of residence. As a result of this policy, the number of girls and young women between the ages of 15 and 24 who can read and write increased from 62.5% in 1991 to 68.2% in 1999 (World Bank, 2016, p. 1). The Universal Basic Education Act was passed in 2004 to ensure that all children receive a free, high-quality education. This was done to support global and local development plans, such as the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and the Millennium Development Goals. In this sense, the Universal Basic Education Commission was created. He talks about how parents and governments at all levels can help children go to school.

The Gender Education Program (GEP), which also began in 2004, aims to reduce gender disparities through projects such as Tutoring, Mentoring and Student Counseling (STUMEC), the Mothers' Association, the Pedagogy Module for Teacher Development (TBTED) and the Girls Education Movement (GEM) (World Bank, 2016, pp. 1-2). These projects have had some success, such as educating stakeholders through school committee platforms to advise and educate students, and setting up a Mothers Association, which is a good way to engage women to make sure their daughters go to school. More than 5,000 mothers' associations have been formed across the country and entrepreneurship and livelihood workshops have been held to give women the skills they need to participate in their families' financial decisions. GEP has also helped create Second Chance Centers for girls who drop out of school due to things like early marriage and early pregnancy (FGN, 2008, p. 42).

The National Education Policy was adopted in 2004 and modified in 2007 (FGN, 2008, p. 42). It speaks to Nigerian values and echoes the idea that education is a tool that can help Nigeria grow. He also wants to make sure all children get an education. It has been changed to include early childhood education, which is a key way to help both girls and boys get a better education. The National Policy on Gender in Basic Education was launched in 2007, its objectives are to promote equitable access and participation in basic enrollment for girls and boys, achieve high completion and achievement rates, advocate for the support of key stakeholders, enable the environment for planning, implementation and achievement of goals (FGN, 2006). (FGN, 2006). In support of this policy, the Federal Ministry of Education has developed the National Framework for Girls and Women in Education. This was aimed at improving the quality of education that girls could receive, among other things, through a human rights-based approach.

The National Gender Policy, adopted in 2006, is designed to take into account the differences between men and women, and to reinforce the differences in the treatment of men and women. It highlights important actions such as cultural reorientation through awareness raising and dialogue, as well as building strategic alliances with important stakeholders such as parliament at the national and regional levels, civil society organizations, intergovernmental agencies, as well as bilateral agencies (Federal Ministry for Women's

Affairs and Social Affairs). Development, 2008, p. 1). (Federal Ministry of Women and Social Development, 2008, p. 1). Most of these policies, such as the National Education Policy, the National Gender Policy, the Universal Basic Education Law, and the National Gender Policy in Basic Education, were modified or adopted between 2004 and 2007, when the enrollment rate of girls in primary school increased from 61.47% in 2004 to more than 63.24% in 2006 (World Bank, 2016). In 2007, the enrollment rate dropped to over 62.6%. In 2008, it dropped sharply to 56.7 percent. This may be due to the 2007-2008 economic crisis and Nigeria's reliance on foreign aid for educational projects, as well as changes in government and politics. The enrollment rate started to slowly increase again in 2009. In 2009 it was 57.84% and in 2010 it was around 58.1%. Since the number of women in school is a controlling factor in the gender parity index, the gender parity index in enrollment rate increased slowly from 2004 to 2006. This was at a time when the National Education Policy, the National Law on Gender in Basic Education and the National Policy on Gender in Basic Education. After 2006, the gender parity index fell rapidly from over 0.89 to 0.81. The number of children out of school fell from almost 4 million in 1999 to more than 3.886 million in 2004.

However, despite government efforts to help them through the aforementioned policies and projects, the number of girls out of school has risen from around 3.88 million in 2006 to more than 4.07 million. in 2007. In 2008, it increased even more., to 4.87 million, and in 2010 it reached a record of 4.97 million. Other policies include the Kid Friendly Initiative and a federal scholarship program for teachers. The Child Rights Act was passed in 2003 by the federal government in 2003, and as of 2011, UNICEF states that the Child Rights Act has only been passed in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states. From 2010 to date, other policies and projects have been adopted to support these policies. As part of efforts to help vulnerable households, a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program was also launched. In 2010, with the help of the World Bank, pilot projects were launched in Kano, Katsina and Bauchi states. One of the main goals of this program is to give families a reason to keep girls in school and enroll them in classes (UNICEF).) (2007, p.1-11). But since there isn't a lot of data, it's hard to say how much these CCTs have helped girls in three states get into school. But it is important to note that many of these government policies and programs can only be seen and read about in the news and on social media. In practice, they do not work due to corrupt officials and other social, cultural and political factors. This may explain why Nigeria has always had problems with girls' education. Carefully examining a number of scholarly articles by various scholars and researchers, it is clear that none of them deal specifically with the Nigerian state and girls' education, especially regarding the Chibok and Dapchi kidnapping saga. It is this gap in the literature that this study aims to fill.

A brief history of Boko Haram

Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA or ISWAP), formerly known as Jam'at Ahl as- Sunnah, and the lid is Da'wa wa'l-Jihd " Sunnah Group for Preaching and Jihad", better known as Boko Haram, is a jihadist militant group based in northeastern Nigeria (Chandler, 2015, pp. 13-19). It also works in northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Pisa and Hume, 2015).

Mohammed Yusuf founded the group in 2002 and Abubakar Shekau has been in power since 2009. When Boko Haram started, they did not use violence in their actions. The main thing they wanted to do was "purify Islam in northern Nigeria." From March 2015 to August 2016, the group worked with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (BBC News, March 7, 2015). Since the current uprising began in 2009, Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands and forced 2.3 million from their homes (New York Times, November 18). In 2015, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Pisa and Hume, 2015).

After the creation of Boko Haram in 2002, it became increasingly extremist, leading to a violent uprising in July 2009 in which its leader was quickly assassinated. His sudden return from the September 2010 mass prison break was accompanied by more sophisticated attacks. At first they were simple attacks on easy

targets, but in 2011 they turned into suicide attacks on police buildings and the UN office in Abuja. The government declared a state of emergency in early 2012, and it was extended to all of northeastern Nigeria the following year. This has led to new abuses by security forces and militant attacks (Moore 2015; The Guardian London, May 1, 2015). Since May 2013, the conflict has forced 2.3 million people to flee their homes. At least 250,000 of them left Nigeria for Cameroon, Chad or Niger (Nichols, 2015). In 2014, Boko Haram killed more than 6,600 people. The group kidnapped many people at once, such as when they took 276 Chibok schoolchildren in April 2014. riots (Buchanan, 2015; Kessler, 2014).

In mid-2014, militants took control of a large area in and around their home state of Borno. In January 2015, the area was estimated at 50,000 square kilometers (20,000 square miles), but they did not take the state capital of Maiduguri, where the group was originally based (The Telegraph, 2015, p. 1). In September 2015, the Nigerian Defense Headquarters Information Director stated that all Boko Haram camps had been destroyed (Ibeh, 2015, pp. 1-2). Many do not believe it because this group continues to cause problems (Thurston, 2017, p. 5). In February 2018, it was reported that 110 girls from the State College of Science and Technology were taken by Boko Haram. So we have to be honest with Boko Haram if we want to find the right solutions.

DATA REPRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirl kidnapping phenomena

Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from their dormitory in Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria on April 14, 2014. To convince the girls to drop out of school, the militants posed as Nigerian soldiers who came to protect them from a Boko Haram attack (Mark, 2015, p. 1). In the hours that followed, Boko Haram took the girls in a convoy to the group's camp in the Sambisa Forest of Borno State. 219 schoolgirls were taken to the Boko Haram camp in the Sambisa forest, and 57 schoolgirls instantly fled the group's convoy when they realized that the "soldiers" were actually Boko Haram (Zenn, 2018, pp. 1-2).

As global media attention focused on the missed Malaysia Airlines flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on May 5, 2014, Shekau posted an hour-long video threatening to "sell" the girls as "slaves of the market" (Zenn, 2018, p. 1-2).

Furthermore, he defended slavery within Islam and its hostility towards "the religion of nationalism, democracy, the constitution, Western education, and all other forms of polytheism" (Zenn, 2018, pp. 1-2). Three weeks after the actual kidnapping, it became the biggest news story in the world. On May 10, 2014, a number of international leaders and celebrities, including US First Lady Michelle Obama, supported the #turningourgirls campaign to demand the release of the girls. On May 12, 2014, Boko Haram released a second split-screen video showing Shekau together with approximately fifty abducted women. In it, Shekau stated, "You [the global community] are making a lot of noise about Chibok girls," adding, "Allah told us to enslave them" (Zenn, 2018, pp. 1-2). In addition, he repeated the requests he has made since 2013 to the Nigerian government for the release of Boko Haram prisoners.

In light of the previous analysis of the Chibok hijacking, it is worth considering how the Dapchi case unfolded and what its long-term consequences are. First, the Dapchi girls' abduction on February 18, 2018 was very similar to the Chibok boys' abduction and may have had an "institutional memory" of the Chibok abduction. As in Chibok, terrorists in army uniforms tricked the girls by shouting "Stop, stop! We are not Boko Haram! We are military; please get in our trucks. We will save you" from a suspected imminent Boko Haram attack.. While several girls escaped through the school walls after seeing "Allah Akbar " written on one of the vehicles in the convoy and believing it to be a prank, more than 100 students were not so lucky (Guardian, March 8, 2018, pp. 1-2).). The Nigerian government's response to the Dapchi and Chibok abductions was similar. Officials initially stated that all the girls at the school had run away or been rescued,

but later confirmed to the media and the girls' parents that 111 girls had been abducted (New Telegraph, March 6, 2018, pp. 1 and 2). It also means that crisis communications, especially school safety, have not improved significantly since the Chibok hijacking. Furthermore, while the perpetrators in Dapchi may have reenacted some aspects of the Boko Haram hijacking of Chibok, Dapchi's location in Yobe State, which is relatively far from Chibok, suggests that the West African vilayat, which has his roots in Boko Haram, was most likely responsible for this kidnapping. Furthermore, the timing of the Dapchi kidnapping, less than a year after the second exchange of Chibok girls, and amid growing media reports of Boko Haram paying €3 million, may indicate that the kidnappers they realized the financial gain they could make by rescuing the girl.. schoolgirls (Wall Street Journal, December 2017, p. 16).

Despite the obvious economic incentives, Dapchi's kidnapping could have benefited the kidnappers because of a week-long truce with the Nigerian government, opening up the possibility of a long-term deal that would relieve pressure from the group and would strengthen its position. position in your country. strongholds in northeastern Nigeria. If the terrorists were to take the Dapchi girls prisoner forever, they would face an ideological dilemma, as all but one of the Dapchi girls were Muslim, while the Chibok girls were mostly Christian. The Boko Haram kidnappers then returned all the surviving girls to their families in Dapchi, except for one Christian girl, telling the community to "never send your children to school again" (Babalola, 2018, p. 1). According to the accounts of the freed Dapchi girls, the Christian woman refused to convert to Islam, even though they consider it legal to "enslave" her until she does (Vanguard, March 21, 2018). The fact that the rebels imprisoned the Dapchi girls for a month and transported them undetected, apparently to the Niger border or beyond, once again demonstrates their high mobility and is far from being "on their last legs", as President Buhari said in December 2017 (New York Times, 21:15 March). A truce between the government and Boko Haram could also help the organization strengthen its presence in Yobe and Borno provinces. Rebels are creating an atmosphere in northeast Nigeria through a combination of violence and threats, making Boko Haram the biggest long-term threat in Nigeria.

Critical appraisal of the kidnapping of Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls

It would seem that the joke that Nigerians wake up every day wondering what the next terrible news is going to be has become both a joke and a reality. On Monday, February 19, 2018, the country woke up to the heartbreaking news of the kidnapping of 110 girls from the Government College of Science and Technology for Women in Dapchi, Yobe state, by members of a terrorist organization. Boko Haram, which the government has repeatedly declared, has been destroyed. Four years ago, in the same Yobe state, members of the same terrorist cult infiltrated the Buni public high school. Yadi, where dozens of male students were killed. Furthermore, we still remember the events of 2014 in Chibok, Borno state, when some 272 girls were kidnapped from a school by a terrorist gang (Moses, 2018, pp. 1-3).

In a Chibok episode comparable to the Dapchi kidnapping, it is stated that some girls managed to escape their kidnappers. And while more than 100 people have been freed in exchange for Boko Haram terrorists in discussions allegedly sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Boko Haram still holds more than 100 hostages. Both abductions took place immediately after security personnel were reported to have been removed from their posts (Moses, 2018, pp. 1-3). How these terrorists can escape without a trace after the successful implementation of such an operation is a mystery that no organization has yet solved. Instead, you are more likely to hear an explicit denial followed by accusations and counter-accusations, as in the latest case involving the administration, the police and the military.

As soon as the Dapchi kidnapping story spread, Nigerians were told that not a single girl had gone missing. The report was later changed to indicate that the military rescued about 50 of them, and the Yobe state administration was quick to apologize to people for spreading false information about the rescue (Moses, 2018, pp. 1-3). Information Minister Alhaji Lai Mohammed's addition that the kidnapping was intended to

humiliate President Muhammad. Bukhari did not improve the situation. The fact that a hundred planes were sent to search for the girls really made the whole situation look like a comedy. And so social networks turned it into mincemeat. If this report were true, every missing woman would be assigned an exterminator, which is a good thing. Many wondered if Nigeria could afford to have 100 fighter jets in the air at the same time and what the government hoped to achieve with this false claim. Many have also wondered who is really behind these kidnappings and for what reason.

Mohammed Sani -Abdu, a member of the Bauchi State House of Representatives, suspects sabotage in Dapchi 's kidnapping and blames the security system. "It is a great embarrassment for Nigeria as this crime occurred in a pattern that indicates our security apparatus is in serious jeopardy," he said (Moses, 2018, pp. 1-3). Henry Achibong, MP for Aqua Ibom State pushes further, portraying the kidnapping of the Dapchi girls as "the government's failure to provide for citizens" (Moses, 2018, pp. 1-3). In fact, he said it could be an attempt by the government to distract Nigerians from the massacres carried out by "devastating" Fulani herdsmen. How can Boko Haram get so many girls out of school when, as we are told, the military effectively crushed Boko Haram? sir goni Boukar-Laval, representing the Dapchi community in the House of Representatives, introduced a resolution of urgent public importance to draw the House's attention to the plight of schoolgirls. Bukar-Laval said Boko Haram has kidnapped students in Yobe state without warning in the past, and wondered why the army evacuated its personnel from the attack-prone region. And immediately after that, the school was attacked.

According to the speaker Yakubu Dogara, the horrific Chibok kidnapping experience was intended to serve as a warning to intelligence agencies to provide adequate protection for other schools in the Northeast. The fact that this is happening in states that are among the states with the lowest enrollment rates for girls indicates a lack of concern for girls' education. Despite the many barriers to girls' education in the North, few parents would allow their daughters to return to school in an environment where girls are routinely assaulted and kidnapped. This will undoubtedly exacerbate the already alarming levels of female illiteracy in a region with the highest rates of teen marriage, childbearing before the age of 15, and stunting maternal deaths and injuries of any country. Akinremi (2018, p. 1) argues that Nigeria is currently a country where terrorist war psychosis, shepherd's madness, and fear of all kinds continue to limit the life cycles of its inhabitants as the government is not open enough. about his disability. Every day, the administration informs Nigerians of its victory over Boko Haram in an attempt to cover up the truth. Then the government representatives will spread the false story of the triumph. And they lied when Boko Haram attacked Dapchi. They first informed the public that "not a single schoolgirl has been kidnapped." The manipulation turned out to be ineffective. They then repeated another statement, informing Nigerians that the schoolgirls had been rescued. As lies breed lies, they begin to dictate news content. They used "disappeared" schoolgirls to cover up another lie, which is another way of claiming that the attack was not a Boko Haram operation (Akinremi, 2018, pp. 1-2). In the end, the security forces began to blame each other for their failings.

Will Ross, editor-in-chief of BBC World Service Africa, saw disturbing parallels to the April 2014 kidnappings in Chibok, 275 kilometers east of Dapchi. At the time, he said, the army and administration initially denied the abductions and remained silent until the jihadists took more than 270 girls into the jungle and set up a camp. Four years later, the world is once again receiving denials and false information from the government, as well as mistrust and anger from parents (BBC News, 2018). Some Nigerians say the government is reluctant to respond or release statements. There is a perception that the current administration has not learned any lessons, coming to power in part due to popular outrage at the way the previous government handled the Chibok hijacking and the Boko Haram situation in general. Despite the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in April 2014, Dapchi did not appear to have a security guard. school _ Yet parents sent their daughters (BBC News, 2018).

The BBC's Abuja correspondent attributed this to the influx of confidence that followed Muhammadu's election in 2015. Buhari, as well as repeated promises that the military was winning the war against Islamic extremists. We also know that the troops were stationed at checkpoints near the city because Yobe State Governor Ibrahim Gaidam told reporters that the militants struck hours after the army left the Dapchi checkpoints. The army has officially acknowledged that the troops have withdrawn and Nigerians want to know who gave the order the day before the assault.

Maj. Gen. Roger Nicholas, commander of operations in the northeast, said in January that the organization had been "completely" destroyed. This mass kidnapping proves otherwise. For me Oladipo, a BBC Africa security journalist, has previously pointed out that these promises contradict the amount of money spent on new equipment to fight the organization, as well as the fact that the group is known to be active in the Lake Chad area (BBC). News, 2018).

The BBC reported that the army came close to arresting a Boko Haram commander in January, but stopped days before being attacked. When they returned, the camp was empty. The army categorically denies this story. These situations are indicative of the nefarious actions of some unpatriotic individuals whose actions are helping the militants continue to effectively target some Nigerians.

Educational consequences of the kidnapping of Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls

Education has been recognized as a fundamental human right since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The education of girls is also defined as a way to promote rapid and complete growth in any culture. This is because girls' education, in addition to teaching them survival skills, values, and competencies, also serves as a panacea for empowerment and growth in any country (Sessou and Agbonkhese, 2018, p. 1).

Unfortunately, while Nigeria continues to face challenges in achieving education for all with more than 10.5 million children out of school, the highest number in the world, continued attacks on the country's schools by Boko Haram rebels and hijackers could quickly quadruple that figure. Amount. Unfortunately, the conflict in the northeast has had the most severe impact on girls' education, as the dangers become very high and girls who used to be excited about going to school are increasingly abandoning their education. In Nigeria, more than 5.5 million school-age girls are out of school; this is more than a third of all women in the country. The net enrollment rate of girls in primary school is 5% lower than that of boys, and the overall enrollment rate in lower secondary education reflects this pattern. Both percentages are around 50%. According to Professor Lillian Salami, Executive Director of the National Institute for Educational Planning and Management (NIEPA), this falls well short of the Sustainable Development Goals (Sessou and Agbonkhese, 2018, p. 1).

Dapchi 's 109 released female students find it difficult to return to school due to low morale. In fact, one of them, 15-year-old Mariam Mohammed Miko, reportedly declared that she would never go back to school despite her desire to become a health worker to help her community. Fatima Mohammed Bilau, another 15-year-old student and the ninth child in a family of 27, was also worried about going back to school, stressing that she has given up on education for now. Yagana Mustafa, 14, said she would only return to school if the government gave her adequate protection. "I will go back to school. But the government has to protect us, the government has to provide security", he pointed out (Sessou & Agbonkhese, 2018, p. 1).

Yobe is already one of the states with the highest rates of female illiteracy, teenage marriages, and number of women without secondary education (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 1). This new Boko Haram attack on the Dapchi Women's College of Science and Technology will further exacerbate the problem. Before the Boko Haram uprising, it was well known that Yobe State was one of the least developed states both in the northeastern states and in the entire country. It lacks infrastructure and other basic social services (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 1).

Girls have long been vulnerable, abused and desecrated in many parts of the world, including rural northern Nigeria. At the risk of appearing feminist, the girl has been dehumanized in various ways and forms. The consequences of being a girl include regular kidnappings, forced conversions and captivity by Boko Haram. Numerous populations are subjected to forced labor, unwanted marriages, rape, human trafficking, falconry, etc. Vanguard (March 1, 2018) sums it up aptly by stating: “Sadly, this [schoolgirl kidnapping] is taking place in the most disadvantaged region nation.

In a nutshell, the kidnapping of the Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls had a significant negative impact on the educational process in northeastern Nigeria. This trend must stop as education is the foundation of growth in today's world. Nigeria cannot afford to acknowledge this fact.

Nigerian government to kidnap schoolgirls Chibok and Dapchi

Boko Haram extremists kidnapped schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno state, and Dapchi, Yobe state. The Nigerian federal government has reacted differently to these kidnappings. It is timely to clarify, starting with Chibok schoolgirls that the rise of the insurgency in early 2010 initially caught the authorities by surprise (Daily Trust, August 8, 2013, pp. 1–2). Initially it was thought that the violence would stop. However, the sustained attacks have provoked darker responses. Since 2012, it has tried to resolve the situation in many ways, notably increasing its military budget from 100 billion naira in 2010 to 927 billion naira in 2011 and 1 trillion naira in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Most of these measures were intended to combat Boko Haram (Handbook, March 10, 2014, p. 1). Other options include toughening anti-terror laws, strengthening the army and other security forces, seeking talks with militants, declaring a state of emergency in the northeast and conducting combat operations against terrorists.

In 2011, former President Jonathan signed the Prevention of Terrorism Act into law to strengthen anti-terrorism laws. To minimize infighting between security services, the Office of the National Security Advisor (NSA) was redesignated in 2012 as the national counterterrorism coordinator. On June 4, 2013, the government outlawed Boko Haram and Ansara, defining their activities as terrorism, and warned that anyone associated with the two organizations would be held accountable. The government is currently prosecuting hundreds of suspected Boko Haram and Ansara members and collaborators. Mohammed Bello Adoke, a former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, stated in 2013 that eleven Boko Haram fighters had been convicted (Leadership, November 22, 2013, p. 1).

Defense Headquarters called for an urgent trial of more than 500 people detained in the northeastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa (The Guardian, December 5, 2013: 1–2). They were among more than 1,400 prisoners inspected by the joint investigation team in Maiduguri, Yola and Damaturu. Those charged included paramilitaries and a doctor who reportedly provided direct logistical assistance to the militants; others who taught them to handle weapons; and others who admitted receiving training in Mali and elsewhere (Vanguard, December 5, 2013, p. 1).

The Center for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in Jaji, Kaduna, in September 2012, released its 9th issue of 316. According to Brigadier General Tijani Golai, the army has trained almost 7,000 soldiers, policemen and members of the Nigerian Civil Defense and Security Corps (NSCDC). In an effort to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities, the army has recently built the first domestically produced armored personnel carriers (APCs) and is currently producing protective equipment such as bulletproof vests.

Former President Jonathan unveiled the first drone designed and built by the Air Force on December 17, 2013. However, high-ranking security officials were the first to admit that their departments were unprepared for today's problems, especially The terrorism. Insufficient funding, lack of training and equipment, inadequate intelligence, corruption, collusion, interagency rivalry, and ineffective political leadership are cited as contributing factors.

Galtimari Committee, appointed by the government to assess security difficulties in the northeast, said in September 2011 that "there are clear operational disruptions, service competition, insufficient funding, lack of equipment, and lack of coordination on the part of the security force." security". This may explain why the Inspector General of Police declared in December 2011 that all suspected Boko Haram members detained were "foot soldiers" and that the security forces did not have enough evidence to capture the sect's leaders (Punch, December 30, 2011). 2011, p.15).

The government also said the police are unprepared to deal with the Boko Haram threat and do not enjoy public trust. Since the end of the military administration in 1999, it has been severely underfunded, less than 5% of the budget, and changes are required. The 2012 budget allocated \$1,000,000 for each soldier, but only \$870,000 for a police officer. By today's standards, police schools can only graduate beaten, disgruntled, and inhuman cops. Many villagers accused the police of selling the names of Boko Haram whistleblowers (Punch, December 30, 2011, pp. 1-5).

Studying rebel conversations was one of the government's responses to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Government has stated that it is willing to dialogue with Boko Haram, although it has sometimes wavered in its commitment to this position. Sometimes the authorities speak of ongoing indirect talks, and sometimes they deny it. On August 2, 2011, the government appointed an eight-member committee chaired by Ousmane Galtimari, its former ambassador to Chad, to study the security threat of Boko Haram and make recommendations to stop the bloodshed. His report of September 26, 2011 calls for dialogue and amnesty for members of the sect who have renounced violence.

September 16, 2011 Former President Olusegun Obasanjo met with Boko Haram fighters in Maiduguri, who outlined the terms of a temporary truce. This was and is the cessation of arrests and deaths of sect members, compensation for the families of sect members killed by security agents, and the prosecution of the police responsible for the extrajudicial execution of Yusuf. In a television interview on November 18, 2012, President Jonathan denied the authorities' frequent accusations of behind-the-scenes discussions.

Jonathan established a 26-man amnesty committee on April 17, 2013 in response to increasing pressure from northern elites, especially Sultan Muhammad Saad of Sokoto. Abubakar. The group was headed by Minister for Special Assignments Kabiru. Tanimú Turaki. He was given a three-month mission (later extended) to negotiate with Boko Haram and encourage it to lay down its arms (Punch, December 30, 2011, p. 1). The committee's report, renamed the Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, was presented to the President on November 5. He stated that many insurgents "reacted positively to the contacts and accepted dialogue options as capable of fully resolving the conflict"; however, Boko Haram and others dismissed the report as a sham (Daily Trust, November 6, 2013, pp. 1-2).

In addition, military and vigilante operations were used. Since early 2011, the government has deployed more than 3,600 people to Maiduguri and other key cities in the northeast as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF), a special unit of the military, police and SSS. They were joined by small contingents from Chad and Niger, part of the Joint Multinational Task Force (JMNTF), originally created to combat smuggling. However, there were not enough soldiers to govern the vast territory (Daily Trust, May 15, 2013, pp. 1-3).

On May 11 and 12, 2013, the government sent an additional 2,000 troops and heavy military equipment, including fighter jets, to Maiduguri. On May 14, Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the Northeast. (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). In a national broadcast, he instructed the military to "take all necessary measures... to end impunity for rebels and terrorists." The next day, warplanes began bombing Boko Haram camps in northern Borno, and the next day soldiers blocked off sections of the border with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The telephone networks in Yobe and Borno were disconnected on May 16 and 17 and remain disconnected. On August 19, the new 7th Army Division, codenamed BOYONA, under the command of a

major general, assumed responsibility for counter-terrorism operations in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Premium Times, August 18, 2013, pp. 1-2). Since June 2013, operations in Maiduguri have been aided by neighborhood youth who initially formed groups to patrol the streets for Boko Haram. They raided the homes of known and suspected members, breaking into or beating them to death before handing them over to the military. This "Civilian JTF" (CJTF), armed with machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords and daggers, played a decisive role in the fight against the rebels. Under the leadership of the sector JTF, the vigilantes are divided into "sectors" in the neighborhood. Residents say human rights violations followed their achievement when they helped expel a significant number of rebels from Maiduguri and stop Boko Haram's killings and bombings in the city.

A JTF spokesperson stated in July 2013 that the military "directed and controlled the activities of these youth organizations ". As part of this, they were issued identification cards and organized into units in specific regions. Although the vigilantes are volunteers, they now receive a salary from the state, and the Joint Task Force pays for the treatment of wounded received as a result of contact with Boko Haram and provides financial support to the families of those who died in battle. With your help, the security situation around Maiduguri has improved significantly. The CJTF has been praised by all parties, including the military. On July 17, 2013, they were named "New National Heroes " by President Jonathan. JTF representative at the time in Maiduguri.

The federal government must adopt a coherent anti-surveillance strategy so that it can engage in real policing initiatives in stopping the proliferation of uncontrolled armed organizations. It must also show that the state is capable of restoring law and order on its own. If the government does not address this issue, militias could spread throughout the country, leading to more bloodshed and a further erosion of the rule of law. This should also ensure that publicly funded organizations such as the CJTF are not used for political purposes during the 2015 elections. The aforementioned measures reduced Boko Haram's ability to carry out the coordinated campaigns it carried out in major urban centers in 2011 and 2012, but the group remained undefeated, as evidenced by the daring attack on military installations in Maiduguri on December 2, 2013 and subsequent attacks.. to civil communities. On February 17, 2014, after a series of violent attacks on villages in Borno state, Governor Kashim raised alarm Shettima warned that the northeast was sinking into a "state of war" and that "given the current situation, we cannot defeat Boko Haram."

On March 14, Boko Haram raided the Giwa barracks in Maiduguri, Borno state, freeing more than 1,000 prisoners suspected of being members or sympathizers of the organization. Three days later, a new video surfaced in which Shekau claimed responsibility for the attack and threatened for the first time to attack oil facilities in the Niger Delta and kill many national officials. These facts indicate that although the government has taken several bold initiatives to combat Boko Haram militants, these actions have not been sufficient and therefore additional methods are needed to achieve the intended goal of completely eradicating the malevolent behavior of the insurgent group.

Regarding the government's response to the kidnapping of the Dapchi schoolgirls, President Muhammadu Buhari said in a speech to stakeholders at the WAWA Hall at Government House, Damaturu : "On February 19, 2018, we woke up to the heartbreaking news of the kidnapping of one hundred and ten students from the State College of Science and Technology for Women. in Dapchi" (Maina, 2018, p.1-2). Since this heinous act took place, I have spared no effort to ensure the recovery of the girls. Buhari said he asked service chiefs and the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to take direct control and report to him daily on attempts to bring the girls back. Within four (4) days after the tragedy, the Minister of Information visited Dapchi and the information from the household returned to the school the following day for evaluation.

President Buhari said he has ordered the re-establishment of the Joint Operating Base, made up of the main agencies and services, to coordinate the rescue efforts. Consequently, service commanders not only formed a

unified command center in Maiduguri, but the military also created several rescue teams to search the jungles of the Northeast Theater of Operations. In addition, the Nigerian Air Force conducted aerial surveillance of the region. The federal government previously sent a team of senior officials to meet with the governor and the girls' parents to reassure them about the government's actions and assess the situation on the ground (Maina, 2018, pp. 1-2).). In addition, the federal government has established a 12-member committee to investigate the student's abduction. The Committee included representatives from law enforcement agencies and local residents. Many expected that any agency, person or organization found to be incompetent or responsible for the abduction of the girls would be punished in accordance with the law.

In addition, the federal government has worked with foreign communities and organizations, as well as our neighbors, to ensure the safe return of the girls. To eradicate terror, the government has explored various measures, including regional and international alliances. Our military, security, and intelligence services have been reshaped by the federal government. They have a higher standard of living and better facilities (Maina, 2018, pp. 1-2).

Middle East and Africa (March 22, 2018, p. 1) reported that the government's early response to the kidnapping was ineffective. The human rights organization Amnesty International states that the army did not respond to several calls that warned of the approach of the rebel convoy to Dapchi. school and ask for directions. However, after that, the administration acted faster. According to the sources, the army, in cooperation with intelligence agencies, using drones and satellite photos provided by Western countries, blocked the hijackers' escape routes across the border into Chad and their strongholds on the Lake Chad Basin.

Due to the activities of the security personnel, the kidnapers were confined to the rugged countryside of Yobe State and cut off from the Sambisa forest camps from other Boko Haram sets. A security official in Abuja said: "We were able to create an atmosphere where a conversation could quickly resolve the issue with a party that has exhausted its choice." No arrests have been made in connection with the kidnapping. Nigerian Information Minister Lai Mohammed stated that no ransom was paid for the girls and that the prisoners were not released (Middle East and Africa, March 22, 2018, p. 1).

President Buhari said the federal government's response to the appalling kidnapping of schoolgirls stands in stark contrast to the callousness of the previous administration, which did nothing until the Chibok girls were kidnapped in 2014 and held captive for more than three years. Thanks to the dedication of this administration, more than 100 Chibok girls have been rescued, reunited with their families, sent back to school and trained. The Dapcha schoolgirls returned to their families. This prompted President Buhari to declare: "Under my supervision, the government will continue to maintain normality and ensure that such cases cease." In his speech he assures that "steps are being taken to achieve these objectives" (Maina, 2018, pp. 1-2).

However, Ekiti State Governor Ayo Fayose, along with many other Nigerians, said: "The kidnapping of the girls is an indictment against the federal government and their release is undoubtedly a ploy hatched by the government and its agents to deceive Nigerians. He said: "Isn't it strange that the kidnapers were able to bring the girls back to Dapchi, and the security officers didn't know when and who brought them back?" Any steps taken to repatriate girls are appropriate, but it may be worth reminding our legislators that playing politics with the lives of young schoolgirls is unacceptable and also works against the development of education in Nigeria.

Findings

This study made several important findings. One is that the Boko Haram insurgency has largely caused a backlog in education in Borno and Yobe states and, indeed, in all of northeastern Nigeria. This is evident in the poor state of schools and attendance in this region of Nigeria today.

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Second, the government's response to domestic insurgencies was grossly ineffective, despite the enormous resources deployed to combat the insurgency. In fact, some Nigerians see these phenomena as an opportunity for the ruling political elite to make money for themselves.

Furthermore, although civil society organizations and the international community have demanded the release of all girls, in practice they have done little to free captured girls, leaving everything in the hands of the Nigerian government.

This study also showed that there is a link between the poor government response and the escalation of internal insurgencies that are affecting the development of education in northeastern Nigeria.

Another conclusion of this study is that the kidnapping of these girls was highly politicized. While the ruling party thought it was doing enough to save the day, the opposition has always seen it as a ploy to gain popularity and legitimacy on the cheap.

Similarly, this study found that high levels of educational underdevelopment strongly influence the development of northeastern Nigeria.

Finally, the kidnapping of Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls today is a phenomenon that, if not properly controlled by the Nigerian state, can lead to a tailspin that may even worsen if not properly addressed.

Conclusion

States bear primary responsibility for the protection of children affected by armed conflict. However, the Nigerian government's response to the humanitarian needs of children affected by the ongoing conflict has not been impressive. Despite the government's recognition of the importance of education for national development, no significant efforts have been made to ensure that children affected by the insurgency have access to school. The Nigerian government has not provided adequate protection for children affected by the insurgency. In light of this, the Nigerian government must take active steps to improve the lives of families affected by the insurgency and develop the affected regions. Our hearts go out to the people of Chibok and Dapchi, and we hope this never happens to our schoolgirls again. Government, religious institutions, business sector and civil society organizations they must increase their investment in peace education. Peace education will help reverse the culture of violence and hostility and instill in every citizen the virtue of peaceful cooperation and non-violence. Peace education should be included in all levels of the educational curriculum in Nigeria, from primary school to secondary school. In addition, the problem of youth radicalization and extremism can be partially mitigated through appropriate educational and outreach programs using specially designed radio and television programs, jingles and group discussions, which will greatly contribute to the repression of the insurgency that hinders the educational process. development in the Northeast. With regard to the abduction of the Chibok and Dapchi girls, we call on the government and civil society groups to do everything possible to ensure that the girls are reunited with their families and reintegrated into society. In addition, a safe environment must be created for these girls to receive the education they want, so as not to hinder other girls and their parents, since education is the most important factor in the growth of any country. Nigeria cannot afford to ignore this reality.

Recommendations

The recommendations of this study are as follows:

- (1) If a girl has not yet been rescued, the government must do everything possible to ensure that she is removed from Boko Haram and reunited with her family.
- (2) The Nigerian government must take aggressive steps to end the insurgency so that northeastern Nigeria can return to peace.

- (3) Using the military to fight the insurgency is good, but the government needs to take a more comprehensive approach to address the economic and social causes of the crisis.
- (4) Steps must be taken to address the prevalence of poverty, unemployment, and low levels of education among northern youth, as this demographic is a potential weapon in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents.
- (5) The government must find and prosecute Boko Haram activists, their financial backers, and their covert supporters.
- (6) The Nigerian Immigration Agency should be properly equipped to secure the Nigeria-Chad and Nigeria-Cameroon borders to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants who assist Boko Haram.
- (7) The adoption of a draft IDP policy is necessary because the lack of a legal and policy framework that clearly defines roles and responsibilities makes it difficult to coordinate humanitarian and development efforts to mitigate the effects of displacement on children., especially in girls. and women.
- (8) The Nigerian Government should give priority to rebuilding schools damaged by insurgents. It is not recommended to rebuild schools in areas currently under assault, as they may be destroyed again by the rebels, resulting in a loss of money. Until peace is restored in the region, the government should try to provide basic education to affected children in IDP camps and host communities by building temporary school facilities, hiring teachers, supplying materials educational or through alternative means, such as broadcasting lessons on the radio or organizing classes in safe public places.
- (9) After the end of the insurgency, children, especially women, should be encouraged to return to school through the provision of scholarships and other incentives. This can be achieved by creating a child-friendly school structure, which can be achieved by providing enough space for games, entertainment and free meals during school hours.
- (10) Northeast schools should have enough security personnel. In addition, an internal school security system must be implemented so that instructors and students have confidence in their safety.
- (11) Children and teachers who have been forced to leave the area should be given all necessary assistance for their rehabilitation and resettlement. War results in displacement that separates children from their families. At the same time, people suffer from hunger, disease, various human rights violations and even death. In addition, the government must make efforts to help young people find their parents and reunite families separated by violence.

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