

# Insecurity in Northern Nigeria: the Socio-Economic Implications for National Development

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**ABSTRACT:** Northern Nigeria has been a hot-bet of violence and insecurity since 2009 when the Boko-Haram sect appeared on the spot-light and was profiled as one of the deadliest terror groups in the world. Since then, the group has sustained their atrocities for over a decade with the seeming helplessness of the Nigerian government in the fight against the terror group. This study is guided by the following research questions: what are the social determinants of insecurity that could be identified in northern Nigeria? and what are the socio-economic implications of insecurity on national development in Nigeria? and the following objectives: to identify the social determinants of insecurity in northern Nigeria and to examine the socio-economic implications of insecurity in northern Nigeria and its effects on national development. The study employed the Durkheim's "Anomie theory" and Merton's "strain theory and as well adopted the ex post facto research design. Secondary data generated from journals and textbook were used for the study while content analysis was used to analyze the data. The study amongst others found out that; thousands of people had lost their lives, while millions are internally displaced in refugee camps both in and outside Nigeria, there is high humanitarian crisis in Nigeria with millions of out-of-school children on yearly basis. The study amongst others recommends that; the federal government should make concerted efforts in securing the nation's porous borders and flush-out these criminal actors from the nation's forest reserves by using modern technologies of asymmetric warfare, and that the nation should introduce state policing mechanism were each state will be empowered to police their domain.

**KEYWORD:** Insecurity, security, boko haram, bandits, anomie.

## Introduction

In recent times, insecurity has become a social problem in Nigeria especially in the Northern part of the country. There are records of different variants of violence and insecurity all of which have lingered with little or no hope of ending. Oluwale (2021) states that instead of security challenges to reduce, it is rather increasing in magnitude and spreading across the entire region with different colorations and interpretations.

These variants of insecurity according to Godknows and Oyaba (2018) are issues of terrorism perpetuated by elements of the Boko Haram sect and the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP), in the North East. While the Fulani herdsman, and ethnic militias invade communities, kidnap victims (especially villagers, commuters and school children), destroy farms, and other means of livelihood in the North West and North Central states of the country.

No doubt, the country has been negatively impacted as a result of the long reign of Boko Haram and its atrocities in the North East. This is further exacerbated by the new trend of incessant mayhems caused by the dreaded Fulani herdsman- armed bandits, and other violent gangs in the North Central and the North West axis (Ovaga, 2012). Issues of banditry, kidnapping of innocent citizens, especially school children and invasion of communities and farmlands has taken a higher toll in northern Nigeria with a downturn on national development. These and other security challenges have affected the economic cum political landscape of the nation and as well destroying the nations image at the international level.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Northern Nigeria had been prone to sectarian and ethnic induced violence over the years. Akpuru-Aja (2007, p.88) states that the misunderstanding between natives and migrant settlers was the singular factor that triggered the Zango-Kalaf Crisis of 1992 in Kaduna. Furthermore, Adesoji (2011, p. 99) also averred that the northern region of Nigeria has experienced several religious crises, especially in states like Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Gombe, Yola, etc. Adamu (2010), equally corroborated that the Maitatsine sectarian crisis that started around 1975 equally snowballed into one of the deadliest religious crises not only in Kano, but also in other major northern states and cities like Yola, Gombe, Kaduna, Jos etc. These attacks recorded more than a thousand death in Yola alone, while over three thousand deaths were recorded at the end of the entire Maitatsine uprising across the north.

No doubt religious and ethnic induced crisis, conflicts and violence persist in the northern region of Nigeria, causing the highest level of insecurity in the country's contemporary history. For instance, the activities of Boko Haram and its splinter group ISWAP have not only devastated the north since 2009, but it has equally resisted many attempts by the Nigerian State to surmount it. Moreover, the high level of insecurity being created by Boko Haram and ISWAP have been further exacerbated by the recent activities of armed Fulani herdsman and bandits, whose activities has an ethnic or migrant-indigene undertone.

In a report by the Global Conflict tracker (2021), it was stated that over 51,567 people have lost their lives, with over 2.5million internally displaced persons, while millions as refugees and internally displaced, since 2011. In line with the above, Ndujihe (2021) avers that an estimated 1,525 Nigerians have been killed by terrorist, bandits, armed herdsman, and other violent gangs in the north within the first six weeks of 2021, with the total number of kidnap victims already above a thousand.

It is against this background that this study aims at investigating the level of insecurity in northern Nigeria in order to identify the empirical indicators that had triggered the high level of insecurity in the region, and as well identify the non-state actors that perpetuate the different variants of insecurity in the affected states, with the intention of critically analyzing its socio-economic implications on national development.

### **Research Questions**

- i. What are the social determinants of insecurity that could be identified in northern Nigeria?
- ii. What are the socio-economic implications of insecurity on national development in Nigeria?

### **Objectives of the Study**

- i. To identify the social determinants of insecurity in northern Nigeria.
- ii. To examine the socio-economic implications of insecurity in northern Nigeria and its effects on national development.

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**Review of literature**

**Insecurity**

The concept of insecurity as noted by Obi and Eboreime (2017) is cross-cutting and multi-dimensional, which has been examined and analyzed by scholars from different perceptions. In this vein, Ewetan and Urhie (2014, p.43) pointed out that insecurity actually connotes different meanings such as: the absence of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, and lack of protection. This means that insecurity is the state of fear or anxiety due to the absence or lack of protection, or the awareness that danger or hurt can happen to an individual any time (Beland, 2015, p.49).

To Okoroafor and Ihezue (2013, p. 96), insecurity could simply be identified as the fear of the unknown, which is the feeling of trepidation and unsafe while Achumba et al. (2013) defines insecurity from two perspectives. First is the state of being open and subjected to danger or the threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. While the second dimension is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague and unpleasant emotion or state of mindset or feeling that is experienced and expressed in anticipation of some misfortune. Hence, reversing mankind and society back to the foregone antiquity of the Hobbesian state of nature. Therefore, in the context of this paper, insecurity would be accepted as any breach of peace and security in northern Nigeria, especially as it impinges on the social, economic and political sectors of national development.

**Insecurity and its consequential effects on national development**

According to Ndahi (2021) one of the dire consequences of insecurity in Nigeria is the loss of lives and properties. The destruction of properties also depletes the standard of living of the residents as it compounds the problem of poverty and unemployment which threatens national development in the country. A secured environment attracts foreign investors and investments that contribute to national development. This is however hampered by the incessant violence in the country. Violent clashes have destroyed infrastructures and create political instability. Ajimobi (2021) notes that the destruction has led to the deterioration of the economic environment and reduction in the desired levels of production. Education is very vital in any national development. As the nation continue to making efforts to put in place basic amenities for the purpose of elevating the education standard of the country, this is however, hampered by incessant closure of schools and institutions in places where the level insecurity is on the high rise. Insecurity often interrupts the education of children through the damage to schools, absence of teachers, changes in family structures and household income. For example, in the northern part of the country that is extremely violent, school year and calendar are disrupted. Schools are often closed, buildings and supplies are destroyed, teachers and students are killed and forced to become refugees in IDP camps (Kwaire, 2019). More so, a report by UNICEF in Asiegbu et al. (2021) revealed how Boko Haram attacks have resulted in the deaths of over 2,295 teachers, with over 19,000 people forced to flee their homes across the Northeast since 2009.

Achumba et al. (2013) identified the following indices as major implications of insecurity and national development and they include: high death rate and low life expectancy, due to rampant killings, poor health care, and malnutrition; severe food shortage due to the inability to access farms and low food production; force evacuation or migration of civilian population to other people states and countries; loss of both domestic and foreign investments; loss of jobs, high unemployment, and the increase of poverty; poor internally generated revenue by the government due to massive loss of jobs; high levels of internally displaced persons and a surge in refugees; destruction of public facilities like schools, hospitals/health centers, telecom facilities, police stations, correctional centers, and personnel; an increase in out of school children and illiteracy level; the need for external borrowing and reliance on foreign aid; diversion of developmental funds, increase in security budgets and security votes of government officials; the erosion of

individual trust, reduction of social cohesion and national integration; an increase in cases of rape, gender violence and abuse of human rights etc.

For instance, despite the government’s claims of technically decimating Boko Haram in 2016, it was later observed that the sect rather up-scaled their operations in the preceding years (Wilson, 2018; Global Conflict Tracker, 2021). This is from the fact that the sect reportedly launched about 150 attacks in 2017, which is a remarkable increase on the 127 attacks of 2016, with about 967 deaths, which became higher than the 910 deaths of 2016 (UNICEF, 2020). Infact, this high casualty rate from the activities of the sect made Bicknell (2020) to conclude that Boko Haram has killed more than the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria put together.

Presently, International Crisis Group (2020) reports that the situation has gotten worse with the infiltration of the region, especially the northwestern flank with different armed groups that are generally classified as “bandits”. The deadly activities of these groups in the northwest have spread from its epicenter in Zamfara state to almost all the other states in the North-West and some states in the North-Central like Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Benue, Taraba, and Kogi state (International Crisis Group, 2020). Hence, the implications of these armed groups had lead to a high level of insecurity, violence, kidnapping, internally displaced persons, refugees, sicknesses, low life expectancy, loss of livelihood, economic shutdown, lack of health care delivery, abuse of human rights, destruction of properties, destruction of public infrastructure, increase in defense budgets, diversion of developmental fund for security votes and maintenance of deteriorating humanitarian needs, loss of national reputation within the international community and lack of national coercion, thereby inducing serious consequences on national development (UNICEF, 2020 ; Global Conflict Tracker, 2021)

**Theoretical Framework**

This study employed the Durkheim’s “Anomie theory” and Merton’s “strain theory”, used by various sociological analysts to explain issues of individual and group misbehaviour, crime, and insecurity. The anomie theory, commonly understood to mean lawlessness, normlessness, valueless, social disorganization, and cultural disjuncture in society, was popularized by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim in 1897. This was improved upon by Robert Merton in 1938 when he discovered a post-anomie variation called the “strain theory” (Mestrovic, 1988, p.60; and Merton, 1938, p.672).

Durkheim in his anomie theory posits that the pursuit of personal wealth and economic aggrandizement has made individuals to pursue only egoistic and selfish ends rather than seeking the common good of the larger community since the industrial revolution and the capitalist economic conquest of modern society. This produces a rat race whereby every man struggles to meet up expectations irrespective of the means to achieve the desired end. This according to Idoniboye-Obu (2018) could be made worse when governments fail in their duty of protecting lives and properties which compels citizens to resort to self-help. As such, Bernburg (2021) observed that the above scenario will trigger a widespread lack of individual and group commitment to constitutionally shared values and standards that were expected to regulate the behaviour and aspirations of individual and groups that had developed distress and deviant behaviours.

More so, Robert King Merton improved on the anomie discourse with the “strain theory”, which argued that the standardized social structures, institutions and processes for growth and acquisition actually push individuals and groups to exhibit strained or deviant behaviours of lawlessness and crime as the means to meet up society’s expectations or climb the social strata of the class society (Merton, 1938, p.673). According to Merton (1938), these deviant characters are compelled mostly by economic, social, political and religious pressures, obligation and established standards that had been created by the iron law of oligarchy. These parameters often compel the affected citizens and groups to either conform (with the institutionally approved means), or become negatively innovative (by designing their own means of achievement and



become prominent through unapproved means), or even organize rebellions as a way of rejecting the established cultural goals (by making practical efforts in replacing the entire system).

It is obvious from the foregoing that the anomie theory and the strain theory actually fit into the ongoing carnage in northern Nigeria and its implication to national development. This is due to the fact that the Boko Haram insurgency (as exemplified by their primary aim) is indeed an agenda to topple and replace the existing educational, political, social, economic and religious systems of the region. This is a clear exhibition of Merton's point of view as the insurgents are actually rebelling against the present socio-political status quo and replacing it with a caliphate-styled socio-political system. The activities of the bandits, herdsmen, and other militias as their activities are only a means to achieve their individual and group desires and expectations through inordinate means, including acts of terrorism, which is seen as a methodology for propagating preferred norms and values through violence (Idoniboye-Obu, 2018). Obviously, these are all reactions to the high-handedness of the institutionalized social structures of the Nigerian society that neglect the yearnings of the masses that had developed diverse behavioural strains and deviances, and have taken to inordinate means in carving out a niche for themselves either individually or as groups.

### **Study Methodology**

This study adopted the ex post facto research design, which according to Obasi (1999, p. 63) simply means "after the fact". This is a critical analysis of institutional and societal phenomenon after it had happened in order to ascertain its cause and effect. In this case, the various incidents of insecurity in northern Nigeria were critically analyzed to ascertain their implications to national development. Hence, content analysis was used to analyze qualitative secondary data that covers insecurity and national development in northern Nigeria. Thus, data was gathered from books, journals, conference papers, bulletins, magazines, newspapers, official gazettes and internet materials which unearthed the high level of insecurity in the region and how it has affected national development, that is, socially, economically and politically.

### **Social Determinants/Non-State-Actors of Insecurity in Northern Nigeria: The arising consequences**

The north has been a hot-bed of religious, ethnic and sectarian violence overtime. As reiterated by scholars like Akpuru-Aja (2007) and Adesoji (2011) the Miatatsine uprisings, Zango-Kataf crisis, Jos religious crisis and other ethno-religious violence had claimed thousands of lives in Northern Nigeria. This had been exacerbated in recent times with the activities of various terrorist groups and militias across the North. From the commencement of Boko Haram activities to this present era of armed bandits and herdsmen, the north had lost thousands of lives, while properties amounting to billions have been lost (Nigeria Security, Tracker, 2021; Ndujihe, 2021).

For instance, the Nigerian Security Tracker maintained that the Boko Haram alone carried out 1044 incidences of terror attacks between 2009 to 2016 alone (UNDP Report, 2018, p. 56). These attacks were carried out with diverse methods including: bombings/explosions; midnight terror attacks; mass murders in churches, mosques and recreational centers; suicide bombings; assassinations; abductions/kidnappings; etcetera, (UNDP Report, 2018). Despite government's claims of technically decimating Boko Haram in 2016, it was later observed that the sect rather up-scaled their operations in the preceding years (Wilson, 2018; UNICEF, 2020). This is from the fact that the sect reportedly launched about 150 attacks in 2017, which is a remarkable increase on the 127 attacks of 2016, with about 967 deaths, which became higher than the 910 deaths of 2016 (UNICEF, 2020). This number have kept increasing on yearly basis with the current number of deaths reaching about 37,500 people according to the Global Conflict Tracker (2021), a conflict tracker and documentation agency affiliated to the United States Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington D.C. In fact, this high casualty rate from the activities of the sect made Bicknell (2020) to conclude that Boko Haram has killed and caused more casualties than the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria put together.

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Presently, the situation has gotten worse with the infiltration of the region, especially the northwestern flank with different armed groups that are generally classified as “bandits” (International Crisis Group, 2020). The activities of these bandits came to national spot-light around 2011 and have accelerated since 2014. Their activities are largely occurring in rural communities in the form of armed Fulani pastorals versus crop farmers on one hand, and between community/state sponsored vigilantes and other deadly armed groups like cattle rustlers, armed robbers, kidnappers and many other deadly criminal gangs on the other hand (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The deadly activities of these groups in the northwest have spread from its epicenter in Zamfara state to almost all the other states in the North-West and some states in the North-Central like Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Benue, Taraba, and Kogi state (International Crisis Group, 2020). For instance, the BBC reality check programme of 2019 pointed out that 52 deaths linked to bandits were recorded in Zamfara state in 2017. And instead of declining, the numbers rather rose to 288 in 2018, while 262 deaths were attributed to them in the first 100 days of 2020. Also in Benue state, armed cattle herders have been unleashing violence on agrarian communities which amount to several deaths on close intervals. For instance, about 72 villagers were buried on mass graves as they were massacred by armed Fulani herdsmen on the first day of January, 2018 (Adebayo and Busari, 2018).

The above sad commentary is said of the other states in the north like Kaduna state, where ethnic classes and armed banditry have claimed scores of lives. This has been corroborated by the Governor of Kaduna state Mallam Nasir El’Rufai, when he was addressing the press about the findings of the 2020 State Annual Security Report. The State Commissioner for Security and Home Affairs Samuel Aruwan recounted that 973 people lost their lives in different communities and local government areas in the state, while 1,972 were kidnapped in 2020 alone.

### **Insecurity in the North: The Socio-Economic Implications for Nigeria**

#### **➤ Humanitarian Crisis**

The high state of violence and insecurity in northern Nigeria has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the history of West Africa in modern times. Reliable figures are actually difficult to attain in some instances as much of the violence occurs in remote rural communities that is difficult to get media coverage. Thus, despite the available conservative figures that are being reported by media houses, it is recorded that thousands of people have been displaced in the north. For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, cited the report of local government authorities as they confirmed that about 210,354 persons have been displaced from 171 towns and villages in the North East and North West (International Crisis Group, 2020). It further reported that about 60,000 of these displaced persons have already fled over to Niger Republic, Republic of Chad, and the Republic of Cameroun as refugees (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The International Committee of the Red Cross equally reported that over 55,000 people have become refugees in the north as at the last two months of the year 2020 alone, with over 30,000 people in 14 refugee camps in Maiduguri, the Bornu state capital (ICRC, 2020). This scenario has affected several families negatively as 70 percent of families in the core northern states have either lost or displaced a family member, or may have relocated for security reasons. This has made the humanitarian situation in northern Nigeria to be the worst scenario in present West Africa. In fact, the Global Security Tracker (2021) in its February report clarified that more than 37,500 people have been killed in the north since 2011, with an estimated 2.5million people displaced, while nearly 244,000 people are now refugees (Global Security Trackers, 2021).

➤ **Poor Health Care and Low life expectancy**

Even before the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, and the violent bandits/herdsmen in the North-West and North-Central regions, Obi and Eboreime (2017) observed that the north in general had some of the worst health indices in the country. This according to them is against the back-drop of a weak health system that was already characterized by inadequate health facilities and dearth of skilled health workers in the region. To worsen the situation, the present high level of insecurity and violence has disrupted the few available health services. This is from the fact that just in Borno state alone, the crisis had destroyed about 788 health facilities, while 48 health workers were killed, with over 250 being injured in 2017 alone (Obi & Eboreime, 2017).

Furthermore, compounding the health situation is the fact that majority of the health facilities are located in “no-go-areas” that are either controlled by insurgents or bandits that makes the available health facilities, especially those in the rural communities inaccessible (WHO Report, 2016). Thus, Borno state alone had lost over 40 percent of its health infrastructure as at 2017 with over 35% of medical doctors and health works leaving the region to safer climes (Obi & Eboreime, 2017). Since 2019, the World Health Organization maintains that an estimated 1.2million people were living in more than 2,300 hard-to-reach communities across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (WHO 2019).

The above scenario has compelled severe health challenges for the country and its international partners as the north has experienced higher cases of air borne and communicable diseases coupled with poor hygiene in the IDP camps and dearth of health practitioners and infrastructure in the region (Egbejule, 2017; Ogunkule et al., 2020). This have made health cases of meningitis, cholera, lassa fever, re-emergence of polio, and other diseases to become near pandemics in the region, which equally affects the nation’s life expectancy rate, especially in the north (WHO, 2019).

➤ **Educational Implications (out-of-school children)**

A significant socio-economic implication of insecurity in the north is the negative impact on the educational sector and national development. Indeed, Boko Haram has operated according to its literary translation, which means “Western education is evil”. This is compelled by the fact that Boko Haram alone has done so much damage to the Nigerian educational sector, which has been further exacerbated by the atrocities of armed herdsmen and bandit across the north (WHO Report, 2016; UNICEF, 2018; and UNICEF, 2020). This is from the fact that a good number of schools have been destroyed in northern Nigeria either by Boko Haram, bandits, and herdsmen, or through communal and religious crisis. For instance, the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) in its 2014 submission, narrated that Boko Haram had already destroyed over 900 schools in Borno alone as at 2014 (GCPEA News, 2014). This according to the agency was quoted by the immediate past governor of Borno state, Alhaji Kashim Shettima who maintained that schools in the state need to be closed as 176 teachers have also lost their lives between 2011 to 2014 alone (GCPEA News, 2014).

As at 2018, Boko Haram alone has abducted over 1,000 children including the 276 girls from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, and the 110 school girls that were later kidnapped in Dapchi (Maclean & Abrak, 2018). Obviously, the total number of kidnapped school children far exceeds 2,000 while over a half of the schools, especially in the North-East has been destroyed. Just in December 2020, more than 500 school boys were abducted by a group of masked gunmen from a secondary school in Kankara in Katsina state (Akinwotu, 2020). Also in February 2021, bandits and herdsmen succeeded in carrying out several kidnap of school children and their teachers in Niger, Katsina and Zamfara states in close succession. These include: the kidnap of 40 people including 27 school children in Kangara, Niger state, the kidnap of 317 girls from the

Girls Science Secondary School, Jangabe, Zamfara state; and another set of 23 students (mostly females) from the Federal College of Forestry in Kaduna state (Paquette & Garba, 2021).

The above implication of insecurity on the nation's educational sector cannot be over-emphasized as several states in the north had closed over two third of their educational facilities, especially from secondary school downward. As Ajumobi (2021) noted, over a total of 800 school children have been kidnapped in the first three months of 2021 alone thereby making UNICEF to declare that the education of 5,330,631 school children have been disrupted in the country with 13.5 million children already out-of-school in the country (UNICEF, 2021; Ajumobi, 2021).

➤ **Economic Implications**

Perhaps one of the devastating impacts of insecurity in Northern Nigeria is its daunting effects on the nation's economy. The incessant killings and bombings of Boko Haram and other killer groups in the north have seriously affected the economic stay of individuals and the economy of the northern states. For instance, due to the high level of insecurity, commercial banks were forced to review their operational hours to begin from 9am to 12noon as against the normal operational period of 8am to 4pm (Mohammed, 2012, p. 12). This new operational plan was adopted by banks in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states. According to Ovaga (2012, p. 29), this new operational plan was only successful in the state capitals of those states as the level of insecurity forced the banks to relocate their branches in the other cities and big towns of these affected states.

Furthermore, the series of attacks made foreign investors and local traders to equally relocate out of the violent prone states especially in Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Zamfara, Jos, amongst others (UNICEF, 2021). This equally affected the local farmers whose farms and livestock were either destroyed, looted or rustled frequently. A good example was the killing of 110 rice farmers on the 30<sup>th</sup> of November, 2020 (Paquette, 2020, p.1). Thus, the disruption of farming and the forceful relocation or closure of businesses has contributed drastically to the rise in unemployment, food shortage and poverty (Ovaga, 2012; UNICEF, 2018). In fact, the poverty rate of the north and the country at large has risen astronomically to the extent that Nigeria was proclaimed in July 2018 and August, 2020 as the poverty capital of the world with over a hundred million people living in severe poverty (Panchal, 2020; Ventura, 2020).

➤ **Implication on National Integration**

The level of insecurity in northern Nigeria has further widened the gaps of disunity, mutual suspicion, inter-ethnic phobia, and had reduced the desire for national integration/cohesion. This is from the fact that every religion or ethnic group is now suspecting the other. According to Godknows and Oyaba (2018) the clashes between suspected bandits, Fulani herders, agrarian farmers and vigilantes have created a high level of mutual distrust especially in the Middle-Belt axis of the country. Also, the killings perpetuated by Boko Haram in the North-East have made the Christians to suspect every Muslim as being violent (Godknows & Oyaba, 2018). As they observed, people were living together side by side either in the same community or even as family members. Thus, present insecurity is creating a high level of disunity and mutual suspicion among the citizenry.

➤ **Implications on National Development**

The socio-economic implications of insecurity affect the totality of the society in terms of development and peace with negative effects on the people's family life, educational system, religious system, political socialization. It also increases unemployment rate, affects life expectancy, engenders poverty, causes food shortage, and increase cases of rape and gender violence. Furthermore, it amounts to loss of foreign investment, increases corruption, negatively affects human development index, and increases lack of social



cohesion/integration. This compels the affected society to depend on foreign aid, and divert developmental funds into security votes (Ovaga, 2012; Obi, 2015).

For instance, in Nigeria, over 500 school children were being kidnapped between January and February alone in the year 2020. This has made the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), to estimate that over 13.3million children are out of school in Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country due to insecurity (UNICEF, 2018). Furthermore, the Human Rights Watch, in its 2020 report on Nigeria, argued that just between January and September, over 363 civilians were killed by Boko Haram insurgents alone. The international organization further claimed that the above number of casualties did not include the soldiers and militias that lost their lives within the period, even as 7.5million people were in need of humanitarian services within this period (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

**Conclusion/Recommendations**

It has been empirically verified from this study that northern Nigeria is experiencing high level of insecurity which had been detrimental to national development due to the socio-economic implications that have characterized the violence. For instance, the Global Security Trackers (2021) enumerated that Boko Haram alone have killed over 37,500 people between 2011 to 2020, with about 2.5million internally displaced persons and 244,000 estimated refugee. Moreover, the estimated numbers of casualties are increasing on a daily basis as various non-state-actors like the armed Fulani herdsmen, bandits, and other violent and criminal gangs operate side by side with Boko Haram in Yobe, Borno, Taraba, Kogi, Niger, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Sokoto and Benue states. Furthermore, aside from these non-state-actors, there are other determinants of violence and insecurity in the north. These are social phenomenon that triggers violence and insecurity, like ethnic sentiments, political idiosyncrasies, religious fanaticism, jihadist agendas, and other conflict indicators that causes insecurity in the region from time to time. It is in light of the above assertion that this paper gives the following recommendations:

1. There is need for the federal government to increase the number of the country’s security personnel and security architecture. This they can do by the introduction and usage of technology in surveillance, intelligence gathering and asymmetric warfare.
2. With the expanding nature of insecurity in Nigeria, th government should make constitutional provisions for a local policing system that can monitor and quell terror groups and insurrections at the grass-root levels and at formative stages.
3. Government should review its stance on the ECOWAS treaty on free movement, so as to curtail the free movement of arms and weapons across the Nigerian borders.
4. The nation’s custom and immigration agencies must be upgraded and increased in order to tighten the nation’s border security architecture in all the country borders.
5. Governments at all levels should encourage and develop facilities for massive entrepreneurial education to equip the teaming youth population with entrepreneurial skills and build industries in order to reduce the negative effects of unemployment and criminality among the youthful population.

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