Globalisation and Electoral Violence in Nigeria, 2011-2019

Amachree, Brown Mathias, Ph.D

Department of Political Science, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education,
Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT: The study examine the nexus between globalisation and electoral violence in Nigeria from 2011 to 2019. This study adopted the dependency theory as its theoretical framework. A qualitative method was employed for the study. The major sources of data collections were textbook, journal publications, Newspaper, Government publications and student theses. These secondary data were subjected to content analysis. The findings revealed that the transnational migration which has been encouraged by globalization also contributes to electoral violence in Nigeria. Young people from crises prone areas of Africa were imported into Nigeria to cause election related violence. Many of these people were unemployed and uneducated and thus can be manipulated by Nigerian politicians. Also, globalisation allows free movement of arms into Nigeria which are used during elections for various forms of malpractice. The result of the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in Nigeria contributed to the shootings and violence before, during and after election elections between 1999 -2019. Globalisation increases the amount of money in circulation during election periods and increases the stakes and interests during the election. In other words, globalisation leads to money politics and all the disadvantages that it holds for democracy. Based on the above findings the study recommended among other things that First, the rejigging of Nigeria's security architecture to check the influx of SALWS into the country and pragmatic economic reforms would free the country from overdependence on the Western Economic System. Fifth, the government should carry out prosecutions of persons implicated in political violence whatever their political affiliations; those prosecuted should include persons who ordered or organized the violence as well as those who carried it out. Stronger legal consequences should be enacted for cases brought before election offences tribunals to act as a deterrence to politicians and voters.

KEYWORD: Globalisation, Violence, Insecurity, Election.

I. INTRODUCTION

The current global emphasis on democratisation has made elections an inevitable leadership choice and succession process, hence spreading elections globally. An election is a formal process of selecting a person for public office or accepting or rejecting an apolitical position. This is usually done in any democratic environment where people can be elected to various positions for a certain period. This is often accompanied by violence depending on the environment. Political violence, which constitutes a major challenge to stability, particularly in Nigeria and Africa in general, is a combination of pre and post-election violence that can lead to chaos and instability in the polity.

This particular problem has become a recurring decimal in Nigeria. Sometimes it occurs during election campaigns. At other times, it happens during and after elections, and its effects on national development cannot be ignored. According to Igbuzor (2010), electoral violence is:

Any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities, including pre, during, and post-election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral processes (p. 45).

Election violence in Nigeria is not a recent issue. It could be traced to as far back as the colonial period. With the exit of Lugard, the British Government was opportune to bring Sir Hugh Clifford. The Clifford Constitution introduced the elective principle into Nigerian politics, which provided for voting in Lagos and Calabar. Restricted as this elective principle was, it was devoid of violence. But the same thing cannot be said of the subsequent elections. As the country advanced in its constitutional development, some centrifugal forces tended to hinder the amalgamation of 1914.

One of such forces was that the colonialists resorted to the manipulation of elections along communal lines. Thus, in the 1951 election in Kano, the colonial administration tried very hard to frustrate Southerners' Northern allies instead of the emirs' candidates. The allies suffered diverse discrimination as they were not allowed to hold public meetings; they were intimidated and victimised to a great extent. Colonial manipulation of elections led to the poisoning of relations between the North and South with the resultant effect of a consequent increase in the social distance between members of their populations (Nnoli, 1980, p.122).

Since then, the country became exposed to diverse electoral violence. Thus the Richards Constitution divided the country into North, East, and West set the stage for violent electoral battles among the three main ethnic groups. However, apart from the pockets of electoral violence that took place in 1953 (the case of Azikiwe's defeat in Western Regional House of Assembly and how he eventually settled down in the East and displaced Chief EyoIta to become the leader of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and that of the electoral violence that followed the1959 general elections). The major electoral violence started in the 1964 federal elections. Two major alliances were formed to contest the election, that is, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) consisting of Northern People's Congress (NPC), Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), and Midwest Democratic Front (MDF). In contrast, the second alliance is the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), consisting of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), Action Group (AG), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).

On Election Day, as a protest against the arrest and imprisonment of UPGA members who were to contest election in the North and West, UPGA leaders directed that their supporters should boycott the election. Ofeimun (2011, p.72) declared that "it was an election so-well orchestrated with violence and so much normlessness that, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the President of the newly declared Republic, initially refused to call Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, to form a government". The 1979 elections were not elections supervised by the civilians; rather, they were supervised by the Obasanjo's military regime. There was not much violence, given that the military played midwife to the elections and transition (Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985). The only outstanding disagreement was the controversial Supreme Court decision on the winner. Earlier, both the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and the military had 13 as the two-thirds of 19. But after the elections, the controversy was raised over the meaning of one-quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation. In collaboration with FEDECO, the military decided to announce Shehu

Shagari as the president by reinterpreting the meaning of one-quarter of two-thirds of nineteen (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985, p.70).

With the 1983 federal elections, the military had quitted the stage and did not supervise these elections. *Ipso facto,* those who could not demonstrate their vandalism and thuggery acts during the 1979 elections had ample time to demonstrate during the 1983 elections. The most violent of the mayhem took place in Ondo State, where the carnage reached the public mayhem level similar to those in 1964-1965. The ostensible cause was the popular reactions against rigged gubernatorial elections, which declared a National Party of Nigeria (NPN)candidate the winner in an overwhelmingly Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) state. As a result of the violent demonstrations, some politicians' entire families were wiped out, and hundreds of houses were set on fire, including the state headquarters of FEDERICO. Three months after the 1983elections were held, the Second Republic was swept into oblivion (Ogundiya, 1999).

The Army struck, and the much tottered democratic experiment was jettisoned through the military coup of 31st December 1983. As a result of much vacillation on the transitional programme, Generals Buhari and Idiagbon was overthrown in a palace coup. This brought in Babangida, who commenced a fruitless transitional programme. General Babangida succeeded in plunging the nation into more violence when he cancelled the presidential election on June 12, 1993. Babangida stepped aside in August 1993 and paved the way for an interim government led by Chief E. Shonekan, which was swept into oblivion following the palace coup led by General Sani Abacha. Abacha was suddenly struck with death while planning to transform himself into a civilian president (Ogundiya, 1999; Iyayi, 2005).

General Abubakar succeeded Abacha and started another transitional programme which necessitated the regime's supervision of the 1999 elections (Ofeimun 2011). Local and international observers reported widespread irregularities in the polls with electoral fraud in favour of one of the candidates. Chief Olu Falae, who was a joint candidate for both the Alliance for Democracy(AD) (later Action Congress of Nigeria ACN) and All People's Party (APP) (later All Nigeria's Peoples Party {ANPP}) showed his displeasure of the elections but did not pursue his appeal against the declaration of Chief Obasanjo as the winner of the presidential elections to the Supreme Court (Olukoshi, 2000, p.25).

The 2003 elections were conducted by the Obasanjo regime, during which political assassination was added to electoral violence. The president himself warned early in 2002 that politicians were raising private militias that could make the 2003 elections bloody, and indeed, it was bloody. Everything pointed to this because a spate of violence had already preceded the elections. In November 2002, disturbances broke out in Kaduna; several high-profile killings with clear political overtones led to heightened security concerns. Thus, the elections' actual conduct brought some welcome surprises as there were few deaths during the 12 April National Assembly elections and the presidential and gubernatorial races a week later. There was abundant evidence of large scale rigging, fraud, and intimidation in many parts of the country (Lewis, 2003, p.142). Nigerians' general observation and conclusion regarding the 2003 election was that no election could be conducted in Nigeria under a civilian government without corruption, electoral malpractices, and violence of the highest order (Ugoh, 2004). However, as the 2007 election drew near, President Obasanjo surprisingly told Nigerians, and the world at large that the 2007 elections would be a 'do-or-die affair'(Nwolise, 2007, p.165). The 2007 elections were the most deadly and frightening in nature.

Therefore, the 2007 election was generally perceived as the worst in the history of election administration in Nigeria because it was characterised by fraudulent practices. The judiciary later

settled these illegalities, but before then, those affected had their positions stolen. According to Adebayo and Omotola (2017) the international monitors commented thus:

The 2007 state and federal elections have fallen short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during the result collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the elections have not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigerian people, and the process cannot be considered to have been credible (p.207).

In 2011, the Northern states of the country were thrown into chaos and anarchy after Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was declared the winner of the 2011 presidential election. Human Rights Watch (2011) reported that about 800 lives were lost due to the post-election violence. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch (2011) claimed that more than 65,000 people were displaced after the 2011 post-election violence. The Nigerian Red Cross Society released a slightly lower figure indicating that the violence displaced 48,000 persons in 12 states (Omenazu & Paschal, 2011). In the run-up to the 2015 elections, the security challenges had become worrisome, most especially in Northern Nigeria and Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. This is largely due to the meteoric rise in the Boko Haram Insurgency.

The CLEEN Foundation Security Threat Assessment published in March 2015 found that 15 states were on a red alert level. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in its Pre-Election Report stated that at least 58 persons had been killed even before the conduct of the 2015 General Elections (CLEEN, 2015). There were changes in the country's political configuration, as could be seen in the formation of a mega opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC). Formed in 2013, APC was the amalgamation of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), and a faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). Former military ruler General Muhammudu Buhari (retd) was picked as the presidential flag bearer for APC.

On the other hand, the PDP, which has dominated Nigeria's political space since 1999, chose the incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as the presidential candidate. Before the 2015 polls, PDP suffered setbacks due to the mass exodus of key political players to APC. Therefore, tension and fear of electoral violence were palpable. And when the elections came, it was marred with violence. Thus, in Rivers State, a police station was attacked and burnt by unknown assailants a night before the election day. In Anambra and Rivers States, voters were faced with violence and intimidation. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) offices in Onitsha North, Onitsha South, Nnewi South, and a local government office in Akwa North, Anambra State were burnt in protest. In the same vein, the violence-marred election in other parts of the nation. In Ekiti State, there was a confrontation between the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) supporters, and election results were blatantly falsified in many areas. Violence was equally reported in the Northern state of Katsina, where opposition supporters burnt down government buildings in protest at the announcement that the PDP had swept the state's gubernatorial polls. Soldiers clashed with angry voters in Nasarawa state. In Oyo state, PDP thugs beat up opposition party officials and hijacked ballot boxes (Ugoh, 2004).

The 2019 elections were also characterised by violence (Human Rights Watch, 2019). And with the level of violence that marred the 2019 elections, it is safe to say that one of the biggest threats to Nigeria's democracy is the problem of violence. Pre-election campaigns, election-time, and post-

elections periods are usually violent in Nigeria, with campaigning in many areas beset by political killings, bombings, and armed clashes between supporters of rival political factions. Even though this plethora of violence forms part of a broader pattern of violence and abuse inherent in Nigeria's largely unaccountable political system, not so much has been done to check whether violence in Nigeria has some external roots.

The problem that propelled this work is a continuous recurrence of violence in Nigeria's general elections. While many studies have been directed at the internal dynamics that give impetus to electoral violence in the country, very few studies have focused on the impact of globalisation. This study seeks to understand the role globalisation plays in the whole problem of electoral violence in Nigeria. Suffice it to say that contingent upon the debilitating effect of electoral violence on the nation's political landscape, a galaxy of reasons about the causes of electoral violence had been raised. A cursory look at the literature suggests several reasons. What is the reason? Some scholars contend that the causes are: greed; electoral abuses and rigging of elections; abuse of political power; alienation, marginalisation, and exclusion; and the political economy of oil (Igbuzor, 2009). Yet, other scholars like Mohammed (2017) and Ali and Adamu, (2015)adduce the following as the causes of the phenomenon: poverty/unemployment; ineffectiveness of security forces and culture of impunity; weak penalties; weak governance and corruption; and proliferation of arms and ammunitions.

Kellner (2017) has observed that while on one level, globalisation significantly increases the supremacy of big corporations and big government, it can also give power to groups and individuals that were previously left out of the democratic dialogue and terrain of political struggle. Right across the developing world, the removal of trade barriers combined with the relaxation of state control over foreign exchange provided sub-national and non-state actors access to international markets, enabling both the sale of resources (including narcotics and diamonds) and the purchase of commodities (including weapons), as well as avenues to spirit profits away to banks in European and North American cities hungry for deposits. This created a perverse and vicious cycle: falling state revenues, leading to increasing ineffectiveness of authority, allowing expanded smuggling, leading to further declines in revenue – a pattern of incentives that could only increase violence. With markets overwhelmingly stronger than states, the international organisations' advice to state leaders about strengthening the state's regulatory functions seems in retrospect either disingenuous or entirely naïve.

Globalisation links people together and brings new commonalities to experience just as it differentiates them and produces new inequalities. In cognisance of this reality, Gilbert and Thom-Otuya (2005, p.198) described it as the "stretching of political, social and economic activities across political frontiers regions and continents." They further posited that global forces' stretching, extensity, and intensity speeds up global interactions and interconnectedness (Gilbert and Thom-Otuya, 2005, p.199). The extensity and intensity of global forces due to globalisation greatly impact the socio-economic cum political lives of people within the international system. It is such an impact in the area of electoral violence in Nigeria that this study seeks to unravel. Therefore, there is need to examine whether globalisation has had any effect on the electoral process in Nigeria and to examine the nature of that effect. Therefore, this research aims to empirically examine the impact of globalisation on Nigeria's electoral violence between 2011 - 2019.

II. Literature Review

Globalisation

The concept of "globalisation" was first employed in a publication entitled: *Towards New Education* in 1930 to denote a holistic view of human experience in education. In the 1960s, the term began to be used by economists, political and social scientists. The term reached the mainstream press in the latter half of the 1980s. Since its inception, the concept of globalisation has inspired competing definitions and interpretations, especially because its historical antecedents date back to the great movements of trade and empire across Asia and the Indian Ocean from the 15th century onwards (Scolte, 2002).

To be sure, globalisation is not new, although the contemporary globalisation process may be different; its essential features are the integration of the global economy under a neoliberal model with an emphasis on monetarism that supports the reserve of hard currencies of the core countries. Adeniji (2002) posits that "the first wave of globalisation lasted for over three and a half centuries. It was what occasioned the pillage of Africa's natural resources and accounted for the enslavement, deportation, and the dislocation of normal life for the majority of Africans" (p.39).

The foregoing nevertheless, the present rate and dynamics of interactions and interdependence of states is unprecedented in human history, and thus can hardly be given a lucid historical evolutionary analysis. The shrinking of the world is so rapid and has become intense that it encompasses all human activities ranging from political, cultural, and economic spheres. Globalisation has stamped its foot strongly on the order of the world and national events, and hence cannot be neglected in any truly holistic social discourse. In fact, no meaningful discussion on contemporary politics, economics, philosophy, ideology, music, law, history, and education can be made without a quick reference to the phenomenon of globalisation.

The phenomenon's centrality has even made most commentators forget the fact that its gigantic nature and inclusion in literature as a concept is only but a recent development. The concept of globalisation started gaining popularity at the dawn of the 20th century when states' interdependence became more apparent. This is why it is wise to agree with Scolte (2002) that when a new word becomes popular, it is often because it captures an important change that is taking place in the world. In other words, new ideas (concepts) are needed to describe new conditions. In the words of Hurrell (2003):

Globalisation is about the universal process or set of processes that generate a multiplicity of linkages and interconnection which transcend the states and societies which make up the modern world system. It involves a dramatic increase in the density and depth of economic, ecological and societal interdependence, with 'density' referring to the increased number, range, and scope of cross-border transactions; and 'depth' to the degree to which that interdependence affects, and is affected by, the ways in which societies are organised domestically (p. 223).

Although the concept of globalisation is not new in the social science literature and perhaps a coinage of the 15th century, its existence as a phenomenon of human cross-border interactions can be traced to generations or centuries back. In essence, the event of trans-border interaction and exchanges existed long before the conceptualisation of the term "globalisation". As Rourke (2005, p.78) succinctly puts it, "though most of the impetus (forces) behind modern globalisation has occurred only recently and in a relatively short time, globalisation is not new as many precursors of modern globalisation date far back into history, even into antiquity." Humans' interaction across geographical space was only given a boost by some development in human and scientific technology. It is important to note that there tends to be an agreement on the developments in modern human existence from which

liberalism and transnationalism gathered their energy. This agreement is on the fact that globalisation has been conceived to explain the tremendous revolutionary changes that have affected our planet as a result of changes that have also taken place in information and communication technologies – processes that have cumulatively led to the villagisation of the globe (Yaqub 2003).

The Concept of Election

Elections lie at the heart of representative democracy and constitute a mirror of the peoples understanding and appreciation of democratic norms (Egwu, 2007; Anifowose, 2003; Iyayi, 2005). Several factors determine the credibility or otherwise of elections, which calls for a closer look at the dynamics of elections' conduct and how available literature is saying about the term election. To capture these conceptual debates, election research applies a wide range of issues, stemming from various disciplinary backgrounds and operating on various government levels, notably ward, local, state, and national. While this divergent background makes it difficult to adopt a one for all conceptual perspective of the election, particular attention is paid to attempts at conceptual clarifications which could be useful to create novel insights. Gwinn and Norton (1992) argue that election is the formal process of selecting a person for public office or accepting or registering a political proposition by voting. They contend that election is one of how a society any organises itself and make specified formal decisions they argue that where voting is free, it acts as a springboard for making rational decisions regarding the power relations in a society and as a method for political allegiance and sacrifice of the individual freedom.

Elections are means of selecting those to represent the people in different public positions within the polity. Election allows citizens to direct the course and cause of public policy (Powell, 2000). Elections could be ratification because they aim to give a sitting government some appearances of popularity and mobilise the people for popular participation in development. But under liberal democracy, elections play wider roles such as instruments of accountability, mobilisation of the people, promotion of legitimacy, among other functions. Competitive political elections are vital to the survival of the liberal variant of democracy. This democratic method of arriving at good political leadership is well expanded in Schumpeter (1942) articulation of this arrangement as the: Institutional arrangement for arriving at political, legislative and administrative decisions. It is a method by which the individual acquires the power to participate in decisions using a competitive struggle for the people's vote.

It is instructive to note that under liberal democracy, words like "competitive struggle" tend to be emphasised more than a consensual approach to politics. Thus, central to the survival of this democratic method is the imperative of playing by the game's rule. The conformity with this stated imperative allows for the uninterrupted transfer of power from one administration to another. Once a sitting government knows that it can be voted out of power within the framework of periodic elections, it strives to pursue the electorates' socio-economic and political interests who may switch allegiance to opposition parties if such government fails to meet their expectations.

Thus, legitimacy, which is seen as "the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society" (Lipset, 1965, p. 25), is central to the survival of liberal democracy. People develop an attachment to and belief in the prevailing political system because they trust in meeting their short and long term needs. The political stability that this system spawns helps to promote development in the body polity. However, for many years, African States operated a misguided development paradigm.

In its strictest sense, there can never be a democracy without an election. Transitions in numerous countries today have continued to reveal that democracy is impossible without an election. But what type of democracy is this? Huntington was, however, quick to point out that, a political system is democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1991, p. 661).

In its proper sense, the election is a process of selecting the officers or representatives of an organisation or group by the vote of its qualified members (Nwolise, 2007). Anifowose defined elections as the process of elite selection by the mass of the population in any given political system (Anifowose, 2003). Elections provide the medium by which the different interest groups within the bourgeois nation-state can stake and resolve their claims to power through peaceful means (Iyayi, 2005). Therefore, elections determine the appropriate way of ensuring that responsible leaders take over the mantle of power.

III. Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the dependency theory as its theoretical framework. The rationale for adopting this theory is anchored on the belief that post-colonial countries' politics and economy cannot be understood without an adequate understanding of their relationship with the global North. This relationship is such that the politics (election, law-making, policy, among others) and economy of post-colonial countries are dialectical reflections of global capital's workings. Dependency theory sees globalisation in terms of the spread of market capitalism, and the exploitation of cheap labour and resources in return for the developed world's obsolete technologies. The dominant view of dependency theorists is that a dominant world capitalist system relies on a division of labour between the rich 'core' countries and poor 'peripheral' countries. Over time, the core countries will exploit their dominance over an increasingly marginalised periphery. To be sure, dependency can be defined as an explanation of a state's economic development in terms of the external influences--political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies. Santos (1971) defines it as.

A historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected. (p.226)

In buttressing this, Ake (1981) posited that "an economy is dependent to the extent that its position and relations to other economies in the international system and articulation of its internal structure make it incapable of auto-centric development"(p.55). In essence, economic dependency refers to the lack of capacity and inability of a country to control its productive processes. The country's economy depends on the foreign economy for direction and control through regulations and foreign economic institutions that directly or indirectly regulate its growth or expansion.

Historically, third-world economic dependence is tied to Western European capitalist expansion and Imperialism. European capitalist expansion was necessitated primarily by the internal contradictions of capitalism in Europe, or what Lenin (1917) referred to as the crises of profitability as reflected in reducing consumption capacity of the ever-increasing mass production of goods; increasing cost of labour and increasing cost of raw materials. According to Lenin, the panacea for these profitability crises required economic expansion overseas to open up new regions for investments, which will guarantee the cheap source of raw materials, access to cheap foreign labour, and access to new global consumer markets. This process culminated in the integration of the hitherto self-sufficient third world countries into the world economic system.

There are three common features to all definitions which most dependency theorists share. First, dependency characterizes the international system as comprised of two sets of states, variously described as dominant/dependent, centre/periphery or metropolitan/satellite. The dominant states are the advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The dependent states are those states of Latin America, Asia, and Africa which have low *per capita,* Gross National Products (GNPs) and rely heavily on the export of a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings. Secondly, both definitions have the assumption that external forces are of singular importance to the economic activities within the dependent states. These external forces include multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interests abroad.

Thirdly, the definitions of dependency all indicate that the relations between dominant and dependent states are dynamic because the interactions between the two sets of states tend to reinforce and intensify the unequal patterns. Moreover, dependency is a very deep-seated historical process, rooted in capitalism's internationalization, the world capitalist system and subsequent exploitation and underdevelopment of the third world. However, on the flip side, this same process aided the growth of industrial capitalism in the West to meet the needs above at the expense of the developing countries (Webster 1989). In examining these dynamics, Frank (1981, p.23) asserted "development and underdevelopment are two different sides of a universal historical process". The same process of capitalist expansion led to the development in Europe and America, leading to underdevelopment in the third world or what he termed the 'development of underdevelopment'. Andrew (1989) and Nkrumah (1965) delineated this process into historical epochs, namely: Mercantile Capitalism (1650-1850); Colonialism (1850-the 1960s) and Neo-Colonialism (Post Independence).

In his analysis of third world dependency, Frank (1976) divided the world capitalist economy into two major components, namely the metropolis and satellite. This typology is synonymous Wallerstein's (1976) centre and periphery world systems classification. The thrust of the dependency theory is the position that third world or peripheral countries are underdeveloped because their economy was fused into the centre capitalist economy through the aforementioned historical processes thereby leaving them dependent on the core economies (Randall & Theobald 1998, p.120). The capitalist world economic system is organized to ensure perpetual domination of the periphery by the core and dependence of the periphery on the core thereby ensuring a continual flow of economic surplus from the satellite/periphery to the metropolis/centre (Eme, 2013).

Therefore, there are two major advantages that this theory has for this work. First, it would make for an easy understanding of how economic factors influence electioneering in Nigeria. It would help the research show the economic undertone of the recurrent electoral violence in Nigeria. Second, the dependency theory would help the research to adequately explain the external forces that Nigeria's elections are dependent on. It would help for a better understanding of the external interests that instigate electoral violence in Nigeria.

IV. Globalisation and Electoral Violence in Nigeria 2011-2019

It is difficult to disconnect violence from unemployment. When people are unemployed, they can be susceptible to violence. The government inability to provide jobs, development and welfare for its citizens, increase the army of those that would be deployed by mischievous politicians for violence during the election. Moreover, the inability of government is a product of external control by the forces of globalisation. The pattern of electoral violence in Nigeria has revealed that violence is more in high unemployment rates. The picture below is a statistic on the level of unemployment in Nigeria.

Moreover, it is not a surprise that areas with high unemployment rates, like Rivers and Bayelsa states, are often those with high violence incidents.

Angaye (1995) has rightly observed that youths take to crime and restiveness as a last resort after seeing corrupt politicians looting the nation's wealth with impunity. Youths graduate and stay at home as much as five, six or even several years without jobs. Therefore, they see criminality as the only way to break the vicious circle of poverty in their families. There is an increasing awareness that states' ability to design more muscular political, structures and processes will depend mainly on their level of economy and ability to fund them. Besides, the essence of modern democracy is elections to select influential leaders and motivate them to act in the public's interest (Treisman, 2009). In the West's developed democracies, voters are often thought to judge incumbents based on economic conditions, rewarding those who preside over prosperity and punishing those whose terms coincide with economic deterioration (Treisman, 2000). In transitional democracies and non-democracies, the citizens may be unable to vote on merit because the most powerful political candidates manipulate them. This is because globalisation has advanced liberal capitalism and the spirit of individualism, which has corrupted people's minds. Consequently, citizens in poorer countries will view political campaigns regarding the personal material benefit a voter will derive from casting a vote.

Electoral violence has caused much harm to democratic stability in Nigeria. To be sure, uncontrolled electoral violence has the potentials of truncating democratic stability in a country. Given the nature of our politics, electoral violence is a luxury we cannot afford. A consequence of this is sabotaging the will of the electorate at the elections. It may lead to a situation where the minority elects leaders that emerge because most fears for their lives will not go near the electoral process. (Amaka, 2005). More so, large scale electoral violence has adverse effects on democratic stability because it negates the essential purpose of elections as a popular basis for government, for instance; a government which by electoral violence sustains itself in power against the wishes of the majority of the electorate lacks the legitimacy or the moral authority that popular mandate bestows (Ezeani, 2005). Electoral violence has created room for the emergence of incompetent persons who occupy vital electoral positions made possible by some political demagogues. The fact that such people are mediocre cannot deliver the dividends as expected by the masses. It is also important to note that due to political violence, some of the best brains in political and economic management are not in governance due to victimization.

The truth is that governments may permit observers to oversee an election but employ violence and other intimidation tactics well in advance of the mission's arrival in the country. Governments may also continue to engage in various forms of election manipulation, even in the presence of monitors (Kelley 2010). Some studies suggest that when election fraud occurs and election monitors are present, those monitors may contribute to higher violence levels. Daxecker (2012) finds that in African elections where international election observers identified serious irregularities with an election's conduct, there was a significant increase in the likelihood of post-election violence. She argues that international observers lend credibility to opposition claims that an election result favouring the incumbent is fraudulent, increasing the likelihood of the opposition protesting the result. This subsequently leads to a violent crackdown by the incumbent.

Smidt (2016) makes a similar argument, stating that international observers increase the likelihood of opposition-sponsored post-election violence, as "opposition groups may find that violence is the most effective communicative tool to catch observers' attention and to target an international audience" (Smidt 2016, p.230). Suppose the election is plagued by significant fraud. In that case, incumbent governments become likely to engage in repression under the presence of observers, again likely over

concerns of opposition protest: "In order to quell heightened opposition mobilisation, governments may resort to more frequent and severe acts of repression" (Smidt, 2016, p. 231).

A similar argument is made by von Borzyskowski (2019). However, she argues that post-election violence only becomes more likely with observer missions when those observers are willing to allege that an election result has been manipulated publicly. Also looking at elections in Africa, Salehyan and Linebarger (2015) show that elections with international observer missions are characterized by significantly more deaths than those without observer missions. They suggest that one possible mechanism behind this finding is that "there may be greater incentives to provoke violence as a way to draw international attention and discredit elections that a group does not think it can win" (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015, p.40).

International observer missions may be more likely to be drawn to elections in countries with a higher potential for violence, meaning that the causal link between the presence of election monitors and higher levels of violence might be questioned. Another crucial international factor is the likelihood of international condemnation over the use of electoral violence. This is mainly a concern for incumbent governments, which may lose access to international aid or risk damaging diplomatic relationships if they stand accused of fomenting violence. However, some regimes can be reasonably confident that they will avoid any sanctions if their domestic political goals align with major international powers. Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) suggest that these considerations have indeed guided the United States' response to electoral violence abroad.

It may be argued that the risk of international legal punishment from bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) may influence politicians' decisions regarding employing election violence. In the wake of post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-2008, the ICC indicted six individuals for their roles in encouraging violence. Former president of Cote d'Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo has also been indicted over his post-election violence role in 2011. However, the cases against several alleged perpetrators in Kenya ultimately collapsed, and the outcome in the Gbagbo case is unknown. Thus, whether or not the ICC will come to serve as an effective deterrent to perpetrating electoral violence remains unclear.

The imperatives of the global openness and the dynamics and ideological context manifested in the competition between and among identities, the changing landscape of information flow, the new platform created by civil society and social movements. One notable feature of globalisation is that social change is expressed in a multiplicity of transitions co-occurring at contradictory levels. The Nigerian economy's nature has been further marginalized by the new global economic environment where export commodities, mostly agricultural products, are underprized in the world market. The result of the ensuing austerity measures which have distributional consequences noted by Elbadawi and Hegrc, (2003), are poverty, deprivation and social and political tension. The struggle for economic resources has led to conflicts, electoral violence and thuggery amongst the people and parties for the political position, which serves as an instrument and platform for primitive accumulation in Nigeria.

Globalisation has polarized the world and the gap between the poor and the rich has widened further. In a study by Elbadawi et al, (2000), there is a direct relationship between low or creative growth and a high risk of civil war or armed conflict because of unemployment and the decrease in the opportunity cost for rebels. Smith (1992), also observed a close relationship between economic crisis and conflict, noting that fifty per cent of the twenty-five most indebted third world countries were at war in 1990 or early 1991.

This argument has been further buttressed by Brown (1995), who submitted that only Tanzania of Africa's thirty-three most indebted and economically distressed countries have so far not been engulfed by conflicts and wars. The many conflicts which have devastated the African states from Somalia to Liberia, the genocidal conflicts of Rwanda and Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and a host of others including the conflicts in Darfur, Sudan, are traceable to severe economic dislocations caused by the impact of globalisation and made worse by unemployment and widespread poverty, which result from staff rationalisation, privatization and massive retrenchment of workers. All these added impetuses to distributional conflicts occasioned by stringent economic regimes. Most globalisation induced conflicts result from one reform policy or another when the governments are responding to the global fever of catching up with the agenda of the development of international capitals. Globalisation is not only a force of marginalisation but inequity and also a factor of fragmentation (Adedeji, 2005)

The technical capacities for violence have been increasing. Just think of the guns, bombs, aeroplanes, etc., and of how modern media enable violent-minded people in one part of the world to learn techniques from and to collaborate with like-minded people elsewhere. Because of all this, there probably is more human violence today than at most times in the past" (Lindley, 2007, p. 23).

Globalisation creates marriages of convenience for violent groups; connected by instantaneous and virtually untraceable communications technologies. Militia groups operate anonymously over vast distance that enables them to disseminate ideas and tactics; recruit fighters, and solicit arms, financial support while masking their authorship amidst the noise of legitimate global interaction (Hanlon, 2008).

Hall (1996) elaborates identity as constantly changing and transforming with historical, social and cultural developments such as globalisation, modernity, and post-colonization. With globalisation, the forces associated with identity formation have become a complex mixture of both local and global elements. In the Nigerian social formation as Jega (2000) rightly argued, the transformation of identity connotes a "continuous process, which suggests the changing role of identities and the heightening magnitude and consequences of identity crisis" (Jega, 2000) as opposed to creating an entirely new identity. As Abdullahi (2013) rightly argued, globalisation has ostensibly increased the layers of identity contestation in northern Nigeria, proliferating platforms upon which Identity struggles are waged. As the effects of globalisation are felt, repressed identities and resentments that were dormant during decades of military dictatorship emerged with the wave of democratisation and have been brought to the forefront of identity contestation especially in the struggle for rights, power, privileges and resources.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the youths' hands has brought about the proliferation of militia groups in the country. In Nigeria, political violence is becoming institutionalised; this is because not even party primary election is free of violence compounded by weapons proliferation. Corruption in the country has created a security paradox that feeds into the proliferation of weapons in Nigeria. Transnational arms traffickers easily corrupt some greedy security personnel.

Globalisation is associated with two trends related to collective violence: on the one hand, are transnational social movements organized around common transnational interests, and on the other, is collective violence (especially civil war) within some states linked to state failure triggered by political and economic impositions of globalisation. State failure involves a process of a rapid, fundamental transformation of the state-society relationship from one of a provider state to one of a more hands-off relationship in terms of delivery of social services (education, health, subsidies, and

so forth) and warfare. The consequence is individual, group, and societal increase in misery, and a simultaneous loss of authority, legitimacy, and cohesion within the state. A further consequence could be factionalisation of the state into social bonds or cleavages (religion, language, class, clan, and so forth). As the state fails, its key institutions (civil service, police, military, and so forth) become increasingly corrupted and unprofessional (Rotberg, 2002; King and Zeng, 2001). Either gradually or speedily, the point is reached when the state cannot guarantee even a modicum of social welfare services. State failure can escalate into state collapse if the situation develops into the open challenge by rebel forces against the incumbent regime. Multiple sovereignties may ensue when rebels control a segment of the territory.

Multiple control of state territory means loss of monopoly over the use of coercion by the state. Such a situation, in turn, increases individual, group, and national insecurity. In-state failure, statehood elements (people, territory, government, sovereignty) become more contested. In terms of people, increased factionalisation and historical, ethnic, or socio-economic identities enhance security results (Esty, 1995). These centrifugal subnational forces result in loss of authority or legitimacy for the incumbent government to the point at which the state loses its internal sovereignty. The compounding problems of regime illegitimacy, loss of authority, mounting frustration and maceration, coupled with some precipitant (e.g., unpopular decision by the incumbent regime, withdrawal of foreign support, and so forth), can result in *collective violence*, especially civil war. The outbreak of civil war is often preceded by protests, riots, or violent demonstrations. The external imposition of economic restructuring within developing nations aggravate class cleavages, widen inequalities that further polarize segments of the population and exacerbate historical and recent grievances (Adepoji, 1993). Some vulnerable states with weak structures or distinct structural weakness are violent eruptions that at times encompass the entire country. In other words, economic restructuring both within and outside the nation-state in response to globalisation requirements tend to produce civil strife in structurally vulnerable states.

Transborder migration is also another effect of globalisation. Globalisation gives room for th importation of violent groups that cause electoral violence. Migration remains a global phenomenon which will most often take place from less developed to areas of greater opportunities. Globalization with its open borders is turning less industrialized to dumping grounds. Both ways, Nigeria in comparison with her neighbours will continue to be flocked by unwarranted immigration from countries such as Niger, Chad and even Cameroun. At the same time, transit goods of all types from all over the world shipped to Togo and Benin Republics will at the end of the day be smuggled to Nigeria in which case Nigeria has a hard nut to crack with her neighbours by permanently expanding her security network along the borders and making international security a major policy plank. For instance, the attack on the 11th of September 2012 has brought increased awareness and relevance to the security implication of international migration. A phenomenon that is often not given much attention by some countries has become a matter for public policy. Between Nigeria and her neighbours, it is viewed as an economic phenomenon and largely beneficial to the migrants especially those crossing the borders from the north, avoiding the scourge of the drought and encroaching desert. All that has changed as international migration is bringing, harsh consequences on the security and diplomatic relations between Nigeria and her neighbours, forcing Nigeria to take an unpopular policy stand against a security threat.

V. Electoral Violence and Security

There are difficulties in understanding and conceptualising the dynamics of prevailing electoral insecurity. A situation in which electoral chaos dominates the electoral process undoubtedly causes both policy and analytical problems for scholars who recognise elections to be an organised system

of choosing political office holders as representatives of the people (Alapiki, 2000). However, the separation of security from the election is inherently problematic as there is an inherent interrelationship. Since the political environment determines the electoral system's viability, the election should be termed free, fair and credible to the extent that security is maintained in line with stipulated electoral guidelines, law and order.

The Nigerian colonial state, in addition to the use of simple selection and the casting of the lot, utilised election in the selection of leaders. It is tied to the quest for political office and power acquisition. In post-colonial Nigeria, studies on election and security have emerged to offer a serious challenge to the dynamics of the electoral system in Nigeria (Ogundiya and Baba, 2005; Mohammed, 2007), which primarily seeks to investigate the institutional and individual apparatus deployed in the conduct of elections, and in particular the extent dominant power relations and elite interest results in violence and its security implications to the wider development of the society.

In recognition of the complex nature of the election, there have been divergent understanding and conceptual exploration of the term, leading to many useful debates on the failure of the Nigerian State to conduct free, fair, credible and violent free elections since the return to democracy. The low transition debate argues that election has mostly failed to be transformational due to inadequate transition (Diamond, 1993). The contention has been that both the political office seekers and the electorates are rarely given adequate education on the function and basis for elections resulting in poor conduct of elections. Diamond (1993) recounts that the return to democracy in most developing countries has mainly been a ―transitory phase‖ in which through repeated practices, democracy deepening and consolidation could be achieved. In this particular context, the electorates directly or indirectly elect their representatives who are accountable to them.

Beyond this ideal notion, the argument is that the electorates are stakeholders in the electoral process. In the Niger Delta political trajectories and literature creating such linkages seem less lucid. The reason for the renewed interest in election and security is perhaps informed by the panic and fear that arises in the polity whenever an election comes up and in particular the problem it has created towards evolving a real democracy in which the wishes of the people could be allowed to prevail untampered by the elite whose political interests are often paramount. This has often resulted in the conceptualisation of election within the context of violence and its possible effects on democracy consolidation.

For instance, Ogundiya and Baba (2005) argued that Nigeria's electoral violence had been a central factor in evaluating the prospects and challenges of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. They chronicled several electoral crises and violence, pointing to the relevance of security. This trend also partly accounts for the increasing pressure within Nigeria for free, fair and credible elections. Thus, the return to democracy had opened to several political trends in Nigeria such as multi-party system, periodic elections, novel electoral enlightenment or voter education suggestive of democracy resurgence. Beyond these, how nascent democracy has fostered transparency in elections is less conceptualised. A significant concern is how the election could redirect political office seekers' orientation and the electorates in line with the changing political system created by democracy.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the data gathered, this study concludes that globalisation involves the trans-border diffusion of knowledge and information through new technologies such as the worldwide web, mobile telephony and liberalised media. But this also involves the sharing of ideas by militia and violent groups. The key issues of the relationship between globalisation and electoral violence could be identified as First, the forces of globalisation have let loose the infrastructure of uncivil society and

accelerated the transnational flows of violent groups/clandestine groups (terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminal syndicates); heightening their organizational effectiveness and lethality. Moreover, all these groups form the stronghold and orchestrators of electoral violence. Second, globalisation has substantially impacted on economic crisis in Nigeria, especially by strangulating infant industries. By increasing the number of unemployed youths, globalisation increases the number of those that would be prone to violence when offered financial benefits. This has heightened the rate of interest in the electioneering process as politics is nearly the only means of economic fortune. Third, the sovereignty of the Nigeria State has been compromised by the activities and the hegemonic interest of multinationals and the sub-national forces of globalisation undermining state-building, creating a crisis of governability and legitimacy. Although transnational organizations (agents of globalization) have influenced democratization which ultimately resulted in more concrete aspiration and so-called implementation of democratic governance in Nigeria, they have done little to ensure the principles of democratic governance are duly respected. Rigging, overstuffing of ballot boxes, falsification of election results or undue delay, and manipulation of a court judgment in many election Tribunals in Nigeria have all been supported by globalisation mechanisms.

The paper makes the following recommendations as possible ways of managing the relationship between globalisation and violence to ensure the eradication of electoral violence in Nigeria's election.

First, the rejigging of Nigeria's security architecture to check the influx of SALWS into the country and pragmatic economic reforms would free the country from overdependence on the Western Economic System.

Second, a pragmatic and proactive effort must be made by those in positions of authority to encourage the growth of infant industries, create employment, and reduce poverty for teeming Nigerian youths. This can be done by the creation of policies of import restrictions. With this, people would not be pawns in the hands of politicians in orchestrating electoral violence. Youth employment and empowerment should be vigorously embarked upon and objectively implemented to give the vast majority of Nigerian youths the opportunity to be gainfully engaged in productive ventures.

Third, the Nigeria security forces have a vital role to play in the fight against the harmful effects of globalization, especially on its young population. The security at the Nigerian state's borders should be reformed and empowered to adequately check import and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Nigerian state.

Fourth, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should pay significant attention to the amount of cash that changes hands during elections, especially inflows from foreigners. There should be a more in-depth look into the expenditures of political parties during the election, and any party involved any shady, or even unnecessary foreign financial dealing should be prosecuted–especially when such dealing increases the tendency for money politics.

Fifth, the government should carry out prosecutions of persons implicated in political violence whatever their political affiliations; those prosecuted should include persons who ordered or organized the violence as well as those who carried it out. Stronger legal consequences should be enacted for cases brought before election offences tribunals to act as a deterrence to politicians and voters. Offenders found guilty should go to jail.

Sixth, Because Nigeria has been mired in electoral violence and crimes ever since her return to civilian governance in 1999, it seems that the need for the establishment of Electoral Crime Commission to deal with Electoral offences, just like the EFCC does with financial crimes, is now imminent as it would help to curb the tendency for people to want to engage in electoral crime.

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